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INTERPRETING, AXIOMATISING AND REPRESENTING
COHERENT CHOICE FUNCTIONS
IN TERMS OF DESIRABILITY
JASPER DE BOCK AND GERT DE COOMAN
ABSTRACT. Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general mathematical
framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able to represent
the set-valued choices that appear in imprecise-probabilistic decision making. We provide
these choice functions with a clear interpretation in terms of desirability, use this inter-
pretation to derive a set of basic coherence axioms, and show that this notion of coherence
leads to a representation in terms of sets of strict preference orders. By imposing additional
properties such as totality, the mixing property and Archimedeanity, we obtain representa-
tion in terms of sets of strict total orders, lexicographic probability systems, coherent lower
previsions or linear previsions.
1. INTRODUCTION
Choice functions provide an elegant unifying mathematical framework for studying set-
valued choice: when presented with a set of options, they generally return a subset of them.
If this subset is a singleton, it provides a unique optimal choice or decision. But if the an-
swer contains multiple options, these are incomparable and no decision is made between
them. Such set-valued choices are a typical feature of decision criteria based on imprecise-
probabilistic uncertainy models, which aim to make reliable decisions in the face of severe
uncertainty. Maximality and E-admissibility are well-known examples. When working
with a choice function, however, it is immaterial whether it is based on such a decision
criterion. The primitive objects on this approach are simply the set-valued choices them-
selves, and the choice function that represents all these choices serves as an uncertainty
model in and by itself.
The seminal work by Seidenfeld et al. [17] has shown that a strong advantage of work-
ing with choice functions is that they allow us to impose axioms on choices, aimed at
characterising what it means for choices to be rational and internally consistent. This is
also what we want to do here, but we believe our angle of approach to be novel and unique:
rather than think of choice intuitively, we provide it with a concrete interpretation in terms
of desirability [4, 7, 8, 26] or binary preference [15]. Another important feature of our
approach is that we consider a very general setting, where the options form an abstract real
vector space; horse lotteries and gambles correspond to special cases.
The basic structure of our paper is as follows. We start in Section 2 by introducing
choice functions and our interpretation for them. Next, in Section 3, we develop an al-
ternative but equivalent way of describing these choice functions: sets of desirable option
sets. We use our interpretation to suggest and motivate a number of rationality, or co-
herence, axioms for such sets of desirable option sets, and show in Section 4 what are
the corresponding coherence axioms for choice (or rejection) functions. Section 5 deals
with the special case of binary choice, and its relation to the theory of sets of desirable
options [4, 7, 8, 26] and binary preference. This is important because our main result in
Section 6 shows that any coherent choice model can be represented in terms of sets of
such binary choice models. In the remaining Sections 7–9, we consider additional ax-
ioms or properties, such as totality, the mixing property, and an Archimedean property,
and prove corresponding representation results. This includes representations in terms of
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sets of strict total orders, sets of lexicographic probability systems, sets of coherent lower
previsions and sets of linear previsions. To facilitate the reading, proofs and intermediate
results have been relegated to the Appendix.
2. CHOICE FUNCTIONS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
A choice functionC is a set-valued operator on sets of options. In particular, for any set
of options A, the corresponding value of C is a subset C(A) of A. The options themselves
are typically actions amongst which a subject wishes to choose. We here follow a very
general approach where these options constitute an abstract real vector space V provided
with a—so-called background—vector ordering  and a strict version ≺. The elements u
of V are called options and V is therefore called the option space. We let V≻0 := {u ∈
V : u ≻ 0}. The purpose of a choice function is to represent our subject’s choices between
such options.
Our motivation for adopting this general framework where options are elements of ab-
stract vector spaces, rather than the more familiar one that focuses on choice between, say,
horse lotteries [2, 3, 11, 15, 17], is its applicability to various contexts.
A typical set-up that is customary in decision theory, for example, is one where every
option has a corresponding reward that depends on the state of a variable X , about which
the subject is typically uncertain. Hence, the reward is uncertain too. As a special case,
therefore, we can consider that the variable X takes values x in some set of states X . The
reward that corresponds to a given option is then a function u on X . If we assume that
this reward can be expressed in terms of a real-valued linear utility scale, this allows us to
identify every act with a real-valued map onX . These maps are often taken to be bounded
and are then called gambles on X . In that context, we can consider the different gambles
on X as our options, and the vector space V as the set of all such gambles. Two popular
vector orderings on V then correspond to choosing
V≻0 := {u ∈ V : u > 0 and u 6= 0} or V≻0 := {u ∈ V : infu > 0},
where> represents the point-wise ordering of gambles, defined by
u > v⇔ (∀x ∈X )u(x)≥ v(x).
Amore general framework, which allows us to dispense with the linearity assumption of
the utility scale, consists in considering as option space the linear space of all bounded real-
valued maps on the set X ×R, where R is a (finite) set of rewards. Zaffalon and Miranda
[27] have shown that, in a context of binary preference relations, this leads to a theory
that is essentially equivalent to the classical horse lottery approach. It tends, however,
to be more elegant, because a linear space is typically easier to work with than a convex
set of horse lotteries. Van Camp [22] has shown that this idea can be straightforwardly
extended from binary preference relations to the more general context of choice functions.
We follow his lead in focusing on linear spaces of options here.
In both of the above-mentioned cases, the options are still bounded real-valued maps.
In fairly recent work, Van Camp et al. [22, 24] have shown that a notion of indifference can
be associated with choice functions quite easily, by moving from the original option space
to its quotient space with respect to the linear subspace of all options that are assessed to
be equivalent to the zero option. Even when the original options are real-valued maps, the
elements of the quotient space will be equivalence classes of such maps—affine subspaces
of the original option space—which can no longer be straightforwardly identified with real-
valued maps. This provides even more incentives for considering options to be vectors in
some abstract linear space V .
Having introduced and motivated our abstract option space V , sets of options can now
be identified with subsets of V , which we call option sets. We restrict our attention here to
finite option sets and will use Q to denote the set of all such finite subsets of V , including
the empty set.
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Definition 1 (Choice function). A choice function C is a map from Q to Q such that
C(A)⊆ A for every A ∈Q.
Options in A that do not belong toC(A) are said to be rejected. This leads to an alternative
but equivalent representation in terms of rejection functions: the rejection function RC
corresponding to a choice functionC is a map from Q to Q, defined by RC(A) := A \C(A)
for all A ∈Q.
Alternatively, a rejection function R can also be independently defined as a map from
Q to Q such that R(A)⊆ A for all A ∈Q. The corresponding choice functionCR is then
clearly defined byCR(A) := A \R(A) for all A ∈Q. Since a choice function is completely
determined by its rejection function, any interpretation for rejection functions automatic-
ally implies an interpretation for choice functions. This allows us to focus on the former.
Our interpretation for rejection functions—and therefore also for choice functions—
now goes as follows. Consider a subject whose uncertainty is represented by a rejection
function R, or equivalently, by a choice function CR . Then for a given option set A ∈ Q,
the statement that an option u ∈ A is rejected from A—that is, that u ∈ R(A)—is taken to
mean that there is at least one option v in A that our subject strictly prefers over u.
If we denote the strict preference of one option v over another option u by v⊲ u, this
can be written succinctly as
(∀A ∈Q)(∀u ∈ A)
(
u ∈ R(A)⇔ (∃v ∈ A)v⊲ u
)
. (1)
In this paper, such a statement—as well as statements such as those in Equations (2)
and (3)—will be interpreted as providing information about a strict preference relation ⊲,
that may or may not be known or specified. The only requirements that we impose on ⊲
is that it should be a strict partial order that extends the background ordering ≻ and is
compatible with the vector space operations on V :
⊲0. ⊲ is irreflexive: for all u ∈ V , u 6⊲u;
⊲1. ⊲ is transitive: for all u,v,w ∈ V , u⊲ v and v⊲w imply that also u⊲w;
⊲2. for all u,v ∈ V , u ≻ v implies that u⊲ v;
⊲3. for all u,v,w ∈ V , u⊲ v implies that—so is equivalent with—u+w⊲ v+w;
⊲4. for all u,v ∈ V and all λ > 0, u⊲ v implies that—so is equivalent with—λu⊲ λv.
We then call such a preference ordering ⊲ coherent. It follows from Axioms ⊲0 and ⊲3
that we can rewrite Equation (1) as
(∀A ∈Q)(∀u ∈ A)
(
u ∈ R(A)⇔ (∃v ∈ A)v− u⊲ 0⇔ (∃v ∈ A \ {u})v− u⊲ 0
)
, (2)
where we use Axiom ⊲3 for the first equivalence, and Axiom ⊲0 for the second. Both
equivalences can be conveniently turned into a single one if we no longer require that u
should belong to A and consider statements of the form u ∈ R(A∪{u}). Equation (2) then
turns into
(∀u ∈ V )(∀A ∈Q)
(
u ∈ R(A∪{u})⇔ (∃v ∈ A)v− u⊲ 0
)
, (3)
So, according to our interpretation, the statement that u is rejected from A ∪{u} is taken
to mean that the option set
A− u := {v− u : v ∈ A} (4)
contains at least one option that, according to ⊲, is strictly preferred to the zero option 0.
3. COHERENT SETS OF DESIRABLE OPTION SETS
A crucial observation at this point is that our interpretation for rejection functions does
not require our subject to specify the strict preference ⊲. Instead, all that is needed is for
her to specify option sets A ∈ Q that—to her—contain at least one option that is strictly
preferred to the zero option 0. Options that are strictly preferred to zero—so options u for
which u⊲0—are also called desirable, which is whywe will call such option sets desirable
option sets and collect them in a set of desirable option sets K ⊆ Q. Our interpretation
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therefore allows a modeller to specify her beliefs by specifying a set of desirable option
sets K ⊆Q.
As can be seen from Equations (3) and (4), such a set of desirable option sets K com-
pletely determines a rejection function R and its corresponding choice functionCR :
(∀u ∈ V )(∀A ∈Q)
(
u ∈ R(A∪{u})⇔ A− u ∈ K
)
. (5)
Our interpretation, together with the basic Axioms ⊲0 and ⊲3, therefore allows the study
of rejection and choice functions to be reduced to the study of sets of desirable option sets.
We let K denote the set of all sets of desirable option sets K ⊆ Q, and consider any
such K ∈ K. The first question to address is when to call K coherent: which properties
should we impose on a set of desirable option sets in order for it to reflect a rational sub-
ject’s beliefs? We propose the following axiomatisation, using (λ ,µ) > 0 as a shorthand
notation for ‘λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0 and λ + µ > 0’.
Definition 2 (Coherence for sets of desirable option sets). A set of desirable option sets
K ⊆Q is called coherent if it satisfies the following axioms:
K0. if A ∈ K then also A \ {0} ∈ K, for all A ∈Q;
K1. {0} /∈ K;
K2. {u} ∈ K, for all u ∈ V≻0;
K3. if A1,A2 ∈ K and if, for all u ∈ A1 and v ∈ A2, (λu,v ,µu,v)> 0, then also
1
{λu,vu+ µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2} ∈ K;
K4. if A1 ∈ K and A1 ⊆ A2, then also A2 ∈ K, for all A1,A2 ∈Q.
We denote the set of all coherent sets of desirable option sets by K.
This axiomatisation is entirely based on our interpretation and the following three axioms
for desirability:
d1. 0 is not desirable;
d2. all u ∈ V≻0 are desirable;
d3. if u,v are desirable and (λ ,µ)> 0, then λu+ µv is desirable.
Each of these three axioms follows trivially from our assumptions on the preference rela-
tion ⊲: d1 follows from ⊲0, d2 follows from ⊲2 and d3 follows from ⊲1 and ⊲4.
2
That the coherence Axioms K0–K4 are implied by our rationality requirements d1–d3
for the concept of desirability, can now be seen as follows. Since a desirable option set
is by definition a set of options that contains at least one desirable option, Axiom K4 is
immediate. Axioms K0 and K1 follow naturally from d1, and Axiom K2 is an immediate
consequence of d2. The argument for Axiom K3 is more subtle. Since A1 and A2 are two
desirable option sets, there must be at least one desirable option u ∈ A1 and one desirable
option v ∈ A2. Since for these two options, the positive linear combination λu,vu+ µu,vv
is again desirable by d3, at least one of the elements of the option set {λu,vu+ µu,vv : u ∈
A1,v ∈ A2} must be a desirable option. Hence, it must be a desirable option set.
4. COHERENT REJECTION FUNCTIONS
Now that we have formulated our basic rationality requirements K0–K4 for sets of de-
sirable option sets K, we are in a position to use their correspondence (5) with rejection
functions R to derive the equivalent rationality requirements for the latter.
1The following simple example might help the reader understand what this axiom allows for. Consider any
two a,b ∈ V , let A1 = A2 = A := {a,b} and choose (λa,a,µa,a) = (1,0), (λa,b,µa,b) = (1,1), (λb,a,µb,a) = (1,1)
and (λb,b,µb,b) = (1,1). Then if A ∈ K, it follows from Axiom K3 that also {a,a+b,2b} ∈ K.
2Conversely, under Axiom ⊲3 for the preference relation ⊲, the three Axioms d1–d3 imply the remaining
Axioms ⊲0–⊲2 and ⊲4.
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Equation (5) already allows us to derive a first and very basic axiom for rejection
functions—and a very similar one for choice functions, left implicit here—without im-
posing any requirements on sets of desirable option sets K:
R0. for all A ∈Q and u ∈ A, u ∈ R(A) if and only if 0 ∈ R(A− u).
Alternatively, we can also consider a slightly different—but clearly equivalent—version
that perhaps displays better the invariance of rejection functions under vector addition:
R′0. for all A ∈Q, u ∈ A and v ∈ V , u ∈ R(A) if and only if u+ v ∈ R(A+ v).
When we do impose requirements on sets of desirable option sets K, Equation (5) al-
lows us to turn them into requirements for rejection (and hence also choice) functions. In
particular, we will see in Proposition 4 below that our Axioms K0–K4 imply that
R1. R( /0) = /0, and R(A) 6= A for all A ∈Q \ { /0};
R2. 0 ∈ R({0,u}), for all u ∈ V≻0;
R3. if A1,A2 ∈ Q such that 0 ∈ R(A1 ∪{0}) and 0 ∈ R(A2 ∪{0}) and if (λu,v ,µu,v) > 0
for all u ∈ A1 and v ∈ A2, then also
0 ∈ R({λu,vu+ µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2}∪{0});
R4. if A1 ⊆ A2 then also R(A1)⊆ R(A2), for all A1,A2 ∈Q.
Axiom R4 is Sen’s condition α [18, 19]. Arthur Van Camp (private communication) has
proved in a direct manner that Aizermann’s condition [1] can be derived from our Ax-
ioms K0–K4 as well. Indirectly, this can also be inferred from our representation results
further on; see Theorem 9 in Section 6, and the discussion following it.
We will call coherent any rejection function that satisfies the five properties R0–R4
above.
Definition 3 (Coherence for rejection and choice functions). A rejection function R is
called coherent if it satisfies the Axioms R0–R4. A choice functionC is called coherent if
the associated rejection function RC is.
Our next result establishes that these notions of coherence are perfectly compatible with
the coherence for sets of desirable option sets that we introduced in Section 3.
Proposition 4. Consider any set of desirable option sets K ∈K and any rejection function
R that are connected by Equation (5). Then K is coherent if and only if R is.
We will from now on work directly with (coherent) sets of desirable option sets and will
use the collective term (coherent) choice models for (coherent) choice functions, rejection
functions, and sets of desirable option sets. Of course, our primary motivation for studying
coherent sets of desirable option sets is their connection with the other two choice models.
This being said, it should however also be clear that our results do not depend on this
connection. The theory of sets of desirable option sets that we are about to develop can
therefore be used independently as well.
5. THE SPECIAL CASE OF BINARY CHOICE
According to our interpretation, the statement that A belongs to a set of desirable option
sets K is taken to mean that A contains at least one desirable option. This implies that
singletons play a special role: for any u ∈ V , stating that {u} ∈ K is equivalent to stating
that u is desirable. For any set of desirable option sets K, these singleton assessments are
captured completely by the set of options
DK := {u ∈ V : {u} ∈ K} (6)
that, according to K, are definitely desirable—preferred to 0. A set of desirable option sets
K ∈K that is completely determined by such singleton assessments is called binary.
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Definition 5 (Binary set of desirable option sets). We call a set of desirable option sets K
binary if
A ∈ K⇔ (∃u ∈ A){u} ∈ K, for all A ∈Q. (7)
In order to explain how any binary set of desirable option sets K is indeed completely
determined by DK , we need a way to associate a rejection function with sets of options
such as DK. To that end, we consider the notion of a set of desirable options: a subset
D of V whose interpretation will be that it consists of the options u ∈ V that our subject
considers desirable. We denote the set of all such sets of desirable options D ⊆ V by D.
With any D ∈ D, our interpretation for rejection functions in Section 2 inspires us to
associate a set of desirable option sets KD , defined by
KD := {A ∈Q : A∩D 6= /0}. (8)
It turns out that a set of desirable options sets K is binary if and only if it has the form KD ,
and the unique representing D is then given by DK .
Proposition 6. A set of desirable options sets K ∈ K is binary if and only if there is
some D ∈ D such that K = KD . This D is then necessarily unique, and equal to DK .
Just like we did for sets of desirable option sets in Section 3, we can use the basic
rationality principles d1–d3 for the notion of desirability—or binary preference—to infer
basic rationality criteria for sets of desirable options. When they do, we call them coherent.
Definition 7 (Coherence for sets of desirable options). A set of desirable optionsD ∈D is
called coherent if it satisfies the following axioms:3
D1. 0 /∈ D;
D2. V≻0 ⊆ D;
D3. if u,v ∈ D and (λ ,µ)> 0, then λu+ µv ∈D.
We denote the set of all coherent sets of desirable options by D.
So a coherent set of desirable options is a convex cone [Axiom D3] in V that does not
contain 0 [Axiom D1] and includes V≻0 [Axiom D2]. Sets of desirable options are an
abstract version of the sets of desirable gambles that have an important part in the literature
on imprecise probability models [4, 8, 13, 26]. This abstraction was first introduced and
studied in great detail in [7, 14].
Our next result shows that the coherence of a binary set of desirable option sets is
completely determined by the coherence of its corresponding set of desirable options.
Proposition 8. Consider any binary set of desirable option sets K ∈ K and let DK ∈ D
be its corresponding set of desirable options. Then K is coherent if and only if DK is.
Conversely, consider any set of desirable options D ∈ D and let KD be its corresponding
binary set of desirable option sets, then KD is coherent if and only if D is.
So the binary coherent sets of desirable option sets are given by {KD : D ∈ D}, allowing
us to call any coherent set of desirable option sets in K\ {KD : D ∈D} non-binary.
What makes coherent sets of desirable options D ∈ D—and hence also coherent binary
sets of desirable option sets—particularly interesting is that they induce a binary preference
order ⊲D—a strict vector ordering—on V , defined by
u⊲D v⇔ u− v ∈ D for all u,v ∈ V . (9)
The preference order ⊲D is coherent—satisfies Axioms ⊲0–⊲4— and furthermore fully
characterises D: one can easily see that u ∈ D if and only if u⊲D 0. Hence, coherent
sets of desirable options and coherent binary sets of desirable option sets are completely
3The Axioms D1–D3 for sets of desirable options should not be confused with the rationality criteria d1–d3
for our primitive notion of desirability—or binary preference. Like the Axioms K0–K4, they are only derived
from these primitive assumptions on the basis of their interpretation.
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determined by a single binary strict preference order between options. This is of course
the reason why we reserve the moniker binary for choice models that are essentially based
on singleton assessments.
6. REPRESENTATION IN TERMS OF SETS OF DESIRABLE OPTIONS
It should be clear—and it should be stressed—at this point that making a direct desirab-
ility assessment for an option u typically requires more of a subject than making a typical
desirability assessment for an option set A: the former requires that our subject should
state that u is desirable, while the latter only requires the subject to state that some option
in A is desirable, but not to specify which. It is this difference—this greater latitude in
making assessments—that guarantees that our account of choice is much richer than one
that is purely based on binary preference. In the framework of sets of desirable option sets,
it is for instance possible to express the belief that at least one of two options u or v is
desirable, while remaining undecided about which of them actually is; in order to express
this belief, it suffices to state that {u,v} ∈ K. This is not possible in the framework of sets
of desirable options. Sets of desirable option sets therefore constitute a much more general
uncertainty framework than sets of desirable options.
So while it is nice that there are sets of desirable option sets KD that are completely
determined by a set of desirable options D, such binary choice models are typically not
what we are interested in here: using KD is equivalent to using D here, so there is no
benefit in using the more convoluted model KD to represent choice. No, it is the non-
binary coherent choice models that we have in our sights. If we replace such a non-binary
coherent set of desirable option sets K by its corresponding set of desirable optionsDK , we
lose information, because then necessarily KDK ⊂ K. Choice models are therefore more
expressive than sets of desirable options. But it turns out that our coherence axioms lead
to a representation result that allows us to still use sets of desirable options, or rather, sets
of them, to completely characterise any coherent choice model.
Theorem 9. A set of desirable option sets K ∈ K is coherent if and only if there is a non-
empty set D ⊆ D of coherent sets of desirable options such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}. The
largest such set D is then D(K) := {D ∈ D : K ⊆ KD}.
Due to the one-to-one correspondence between coherent sets of desirable options D and
coherent preference orders ⊲D , this representation result tells us that working with a co-
herent set of desirable option sets K is equivalent to working with the set of those coherent
preference orders ⊲D for which K ⊆ KD . For the rejection function R that corresponds to
K through Equation (5), u ∈ R(A)means that u is dominated in A for all these representing
coherent preference orders⊲D . Similarly, u ∈CR(A)means that u is undominated accord-
ing to at least one of these representing coherent preference orders ⊲D . This effectively
tells us that our coherence axioms K0–K4 for choice models characterise a generalised
type of choice under Levi’s notion of E-admissibility [9, 20, 24], but with representing
preference orders⊲D that need not be total orders based on comparing expectations.
Interestingly, any potential property of sets of desirable option sets that is preserved
under taking arbitrary intersections, and that the binary choice models satisfy, is inherited
from the binary models through the representation result of Theorem 9. It is easy to see
that this applies in particular to Aizermann’s condition [1].
7. IMPOSING TOTALITY
We have just shown that every coherent choice model K can be represented by a collec-
tion of coherent sets of desirable options D. This leads us to wonder whether it is possible
to achieve representation using only particular types of coherent D, and, if yes, for which
types of coherent sets of desirable option sets K—and hence for which types of rejection
functions R and choice functions C—this is possible. In this section, we clear the air by
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starting with a rather simple case, where we restrict attention to total sets of desirable
options D, corresponding to total preference orders⊲D .
Definition 10 (Totality for sets of desirable options). We call a set of desirable options
D ∈ D total if it is coherent and
DT. for all u ∈ V \ {0}, either u ∈ D or −u ∈ D.
The set of all total sets of desirable options is denoted by DT.
That the binary preference order ⊲D corresponding to a total set of desirable options D is
indeed a total order can be seen as follows. For all u,v ∈V such that u 6= v, the property DT
implies that either u− v ∈ D or v− u ∈ D. Hence, for all u,v ∈ V , we have that either
u = v, u⊲D v or v⊲D u, which indeed makes ⊲D a total order.
It was shown in [4, 8] that what we call total sets of desirable options here, are precisely
the maximal or undominated coherent ones, i.e. those coherentD ∈D that are not included
in any other coherent set of desirable option sets: (∀D′ ∈ D)(D ⊆ D′ ⇒ D = D′). The
question of which types of binary sets of desirable option sets KD the total D correspond
to, is answered by the following definition and proposition.
Definition 11 (Totality for sets of desirable option sets). We call a set of desirable option
sets K ∈K total if it is coherent and
KT. {u,−u} ∈ K for all u ∈ V \ {0}.
The set of all total sets of desirable options is denoted by KT.
Proposition 12. For any set of desirable options D ∈ D, D is total if and only if KD is, so
KD ∈KT ⇔D ∈ DT.
So a binary K is total if and only if its corresponding DK is. For general total sets of
desirable option sets K ∈ KT, which are not necessarily binary, we nevertheless still have
representation in terms of total binary ones.
Theorem 13. A set of desirable option sets K ∈K is total if and only if there is a non-empty
set D ⊆ DT of total sets of desirable options such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D}. The largest
such set D is then DT(K) := {D ∈DT : K ⊆ KD}.
This representation result shows that our total choice models correspond a generalised type
of choice under Levi’s notion of E-admissibility [9, 20], but with representing preference
orders ⊲D that are now maximal, or undominated. They correspond what Van Camp et
al. [24, Section 4] have calledM-admissible choice models. Our discussion above provides
an axiomatic characterisation for such choice models.
We conclude our study of totality by characterising what it means for a rejection func-
tion to be total.
Proposition 14. Consider any set of desirable option sets K ∈ K and any rejection func-
tion R that are connected by Equation (5). Then K is total if and only if R is coherent and
satisfies
RT. 0 ∈ R({0,u,−u}), for all u ∈ V \ {0}.
8. IMPOSING THE MIXING PROPERTY
Totality is, of course, a very strong requirement, and it leads to a very special and
restrictive type of representation. We therefore now turn to weaker requirements, and their
consequences for representation. One such additional property, which sometimes pops
up in the literature about choice and rejection functions, is the following mixing property
[17, 22], which asserts that an option that is rejected continues to be rejected if one removes
mixed options—convex combinations of other options in the option set:4
4Van Camp [22] refers to this property as ‘convexity’, but we prefer to stick to the original name suggested
by Seidenfeld et al. [17] for the sake of avoiding confusion. We nevertheless want to point out that in a context
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RM. if A ⊆ B ⊆ conv(A) then also R(B)∩A ⊆ R(A), for all A,B ∈Q,
where conv(·) is the convex hull operator, defined by
conv(V ) :=
{
n
∑
k=1
λkuk : n ∈ N,λk ∈R>0,
n
∑
k=1
λk = 1,uk ∈V
}
for all V ⊆ V . (10)
N is the set of natural numbers, or in other words all positive integers, excluding 0, and
R>0 is the set of all (strictly) positive reals. A rejection function that satisfies this mixing
property is called mixing.
The following result characterises the mixing property in terms of the corresponding
set of desirable option sets. We provide two equivalent conditions: one in terms of the
convex hull operator, and one in terms of the posi(·) operator, which, for any subset V
of V , returns the set of all positive linear combinations of its elements:
posi(V ) :=
{
n
∑
k=1
λkuk : n ∈N,λk ∈ R>0,uk ∈V
}
. (11)
Proposition 15. Consider any set of desirable option sets K ∈ K and any rejection func-
tion R that are connected by Equation (5). Then R is coherent and mixing if and only if K
is coherent and satisfies any—and hence both—of the following conditions:
KM. if B ∈ K and A ⊆ B ⊆ posi(A), then also A ∈ K, for all A,B ∈Q;
K′M. if B ∈ K and A ⊆ B ⊆ conv(A), then also A ∈ K, for all A,B ∈Q.
In the context of sets of desirable options in linear spaces, we prefer to use the posi(·)
operator because it fits more naturally with Axiom d3. We therefore adopt Axiom KM as
our definition for mixingness.
Definition 16 (Mixing property for sets of desirable option sets). We call a set of desirable
option sets K ∈ K mixing if it is coherent and satisfies KM. The set of all mixing sets of
desirable options is denoted by KM.
We now proceed to show that these mixing sets of desirable option sets allow for a rep-
resentation in terms of sets of desirable options that are themselvesmixing, in the following
sense.
Definition 17 (Mixing property for sets of desirable options). We call a set of desirable
options D ∈D mixing if it is coherent and
DM. for all A ∈Q, if posi(A)∩D 6= /0, then also A∩D 6= /0.
We denote the set of all mixing sets of desirable options by DM.
The binary elements of KM are precisely the ones based on such a mixing set of desir-
able options; they can be represented by a single element of DM.
Proposition 18. For any set of desirable options D ∈ D, KD is mixing if and only if D is,
so KD ∈KM ⇔ D ∈ DM.
For general mixing sets of desirable option sets that are not necessarily binary, we never-
theless still obtain a representation theorem analogous to Theorems 9 and 13, where the
representing sets of desirable options are now mixing.
Theorem 19. A set of desirable option sets K ∈ K is mixing if and only if there is a non-
empty set D ⊆ DM of mixing sets of desirable options such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}. The
largest such set D is then DM(K) := {D ∈ DM : K ⊆ KD}.
that focuses on rejection rather than choice, the term ‘unmixing’ would be preferable, because the rejection is
preserved under removing mixed options—whereas the choice is preserved under adding mixed options.
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This representation result is akin to the one proved by Seidenfeld et al [17], but without the
additional condition of weak Archimedeanity they impose. In order to better explain this,
and to provide this result with some extra intuition, we take a closer look at the mixing sets
of desirable options that make up our representation. The following result is an equivalent
characterisation of such sets.
Proposition 20. Consider any set of desirable options D ∈ D and let Dc := V \D. Then
D is mixing if and only if posi(Dc) = Dc.
So we see that the coherent sets of desirable options that are also mixing are precisely
those whose complement is again a convex cone.5 They are therefore identical to the
lexicographic sets of desirable options sets introduced by Van Camp et al. [22, 23]. What
makes this particularly relevant and interesting is that these authors have shown that when
V is the set of all gambles on some finite set X and V≻0 = {u ∈ V : u ≥ 0 and u 6= 0},
then the sets of desirable options in D that are lexicographic—and therefore mixing—
are exactly the ones that are representable by some lexicographic probability system that
has no non-trivial Savage-null events. This is, of course, the reason why they decided to
call such coherent sets of desirable options lexicographic. Because of this connection, it
follows that in their setting, Theorem 19 implies that every mixing choice model can be
represented by a set of lexicographic probability systems.
Due to the equivalence between coherent lexicographic sets of desirable options and
mixing ones on the one hand, and between total sets of desirable options and maximal
coherent ones on the other, the following proposition is an immediate consequence of a
similar result by Van Camp et al. [22, 23]. It shows that the total sets of desirable options
constitute a subclass of the mixing ones: mixingness is a weaker requirement than totality.
Proposition 21. Every total set of desirable options is mixing: DT ⊆ DM.
By combining this result with Theorems 13 and 19, it follows that every total set of desir-
able options sets is mixing, and similarly for rejection and choice functions. So mixingness
is implied by totality for non-binary choice models as well. Since totality is arguably the
more intuitive of the two, one might therefore be inclined to discard the mixing property
in favour of totality. We have nevertheless studied the mixing property in some detail,
because it can be combined with other properties, such as the notions of Archimedeanity
studied in the next section. As we will see, this combination leads to very intuitive repres-
entation, where the role of lexicographic probability systems is taken over by expectation
operators—called linear previsions.
9. IMPOSING ARCHIMEDEANITY
There are a number of ways a notion of Archimedeanity can be introduced for prefer-
ence relations and choice models [2, 3, 11, 15, 17]. Its aim is always to guarantee that the
real number system is expressive enough, or more precisely, that the preferences expressed
by the models can be represented by (sets of) real-valued probabilities and utilities, rather
than, say, probabilities and utilities expressed using hyper-reals. Here, we consider a no-
tion of Archimedeanity that is close in spirit to an idea explored by Walley [25, 26] in his
discussion of so-called strict desirability.
For the sake of simplicity, we will restrict ourselves to a particular case of our abstract
framework,6 where V := L (X ) is the set of all gambles on a set of states X and V≻0 =
Lsp(X ) := {u ∈ L (X ) : infu > 0}. We identify every real number µ ∈ R with the
constant gamble that takes the value µ , and then define Archimedeanity as follows.
5Recall that coherent sets of desirable options are convex cones because of Axiom D3.
6It is possible to introduce a version of our notion of Archimedeanity in our general framework as well, but
explaining how this works would take up much more space than we are allowed in this conference paper.
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Definition 22 (Archimedean set of desirable options). We call a set of desirable options
D ∈ D Archimedean if it is coherent and satisfies the following openness condition:
DA. for all u ∈ D, there is some ε ∈ R>0 such that u− ε ∈ D.
We denote the set of all Archimedean sets of desirable options by DA, and let DM,A be the
set of all Archimedean sets of desirable options that are also mixing.
What makes Archimedean and mixing Archimedean sets of desirable options partic-
ularly interesting, is that they are in a one-to-one correspondence with coherent lower
previsions and linear previsions [25], respectively.
Definition 23 (Coherent lower prevision and linear prevision). A coherent lower prevision
P on L (X ) is a real-valued map on L (X ) that satisfies
LP1. P(u)≥ infu for all u ∈L (X );
LP2. P(λu) = λP(u) for all u ∈L (X ) and λ ∈ R>0;
LP3. P(u+ v)≥ P(u)+P(v) for all u,v ∈L (X );
A linear prevision P on L (X ) is a coherent lower prevision that additionally satisfies
P3. P(u+ v) = P(u)+P(v) for all u,v ∈L (X );
We denote the set of all coherent lower previsions on L (X ) by P and let P be the subset
of all linear previsions.
In order to make the above-mentioned one-to-one correspondences explicit, we intro-
duce the followingmaps. With any set of desirable optionsD inD, we associate a (possibly
extended) real functional PD on L (X ), defined by
PD(u) := sup{µ ∈ R : u− µ ∈ D}, for all u ∈L (X ). (12)
Conversely, with any (possibly extended) real functional P on L (X ), we associate a set
of desirable options
DP := {u ∈L (X ) : P(u)> 0}. (13)
Our next result shows that these two maps lead to an isomorphism between DA and P, and
similarly for DM,A and P.
Proposition 24. For any Archimedean set of desirable options D, PD is a coherent lower
prevision on L (X ) and DPD =D. If D is moreover mixing, then PD is a linear prevision.
Conversely, for any coherent lower prevision P on L (X ), DP is an Archimedean set of
desirable options and PDP = P. If P is furthermore a linear prevision, then DP is mixing.
The import of these correspondences is that any representation in terms of sets of
Archimedean (mixing) sets of desirable options is effectively a representation in terms
of sets of coherent lower (or linear) previsions. As we will see, these kinds of representa-
tions can be obtained for sets of desirable option sets—and hence also rejection and choice
functions—that are themselves Archimedean in the following sense.
Definition 25 (Archimedean set of desirable option sets). We call a set of desirable option
sets K ∈K Archimedean if it is coherent and satisfies
KA. for all A ∈ K, there is some ε ∈R>0 such that A− ε ∈ K.
We denote the set of all Archimedean sets of desirable option sets by KA, and let KM,A be
the set of all Archimedean sets of desirable options that are also mixing.
This notion easily translates from sets of desirable option sets to rejection functions.
Proposition 26. Consider any set of desirable option sets K ∈ K and any rejection func-
tion R that are connected by Equation (5). Then K is Archimedean if and only if R is
coherent and satisfies
RA. for all A ∈Q and u ∈ V such that u ∈ R(A ∪{u}), there is some ε ∈ R>0 such that
u ∈ R((A− ε)∪{u}).
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A first and basic result is that our notion of Archimedeanity for sets of desirable option
sets is compatible with that for sets of desirable options.
Proposition 27. For any set of desirable options D ∈D, KD is Archimedean (and mixing)
if and only if D is, so KD ∈KA ⇔D ∈DA and KD ∈KM,A ⇔ D ∈ DM,A.
In order to state our representation results for Archimedean choice models that are not
necessarily binary, we require a final piece of machinery: a topology on DA and DM,A, or
equivalently, a notion of closedness. We do this by defining the convergence of a sequence
of Archimedean sets of desirable options {Dn}n∈N in terms of the point-wise convergence
of the corresponding sequence of coherent lower previsions:
lim
n→+∞
Dn = D⇔
(
∀u ∈L (X )
)
lim
n→+∞
PDn(u) = PD(u). (14)
A set D ⊆ DA of Archimedean sets of desirable options is then called closed if it con-
tains all of its limit points, or equivalently, if the corresponding set of coherent lower
previsions—or linear previsions when D ⊆ DM,A—is closed with respect to point-wise
convergence.
Our final representation results state that a set of desirable option sets K is Archimedean
if and only if it can be represented by such a closed set, and if K is moreover mixing, the
elements of the representing closed set are as well.
Theorem 28 (Representation for Archimedean choice functions). A set of desirable option
sets K ∈ K is Archimedean if and only if there is some non-empty closed set D ⊆ DA of
Archimedean sets of desirable options such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D}. The largest such
set D is then DA(K) := {D ∈ DA : K ⊆ KD}.
Theorem 29 (Representation for Archimedean mixing choice functions). A set of de-
sirable option sets K ∈ K is mixing and Archimedean if and only if there is some non-
empty closed set D ⊆DM,A of mixing and Archimedean sets of desirable options such that
K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}. The largest such set D is then DM,A(K) := {D ∈DM,A : K ⊆ KD}.
If we combine Theorem 29 with the correspondence result of Proposition 24, we see
that Axioms K0–K4 together with KM and KA characterise exactly those choice models
that are based on E-admissibility with respect to a closed—but not necessarily convex—
set of linear previsions. In much the same way, Theorem 28 can be seen to characterise
a generalised notion of E-admissibility, where the representing objects are coherent lower
previsions. Walley–Sen maximality [20, 25] can be regarded as a special case of this
generalised notion, where only a single representing coherent lower prevision is needed.
10. CONCLUSION
The main conclusion of this paper is that the language of desirability is capable of
representing non-binary choice models, provided we extend it with a notion of disjunction,
allowing statements such as ‘at least one of these two options is desirable’. When we do
so, the resulting framework of sets of desirable options turns out to be a very flexible and
elegant tool for representing set-valued choice. Not only does it include E-admissibility
and maximality, it also opens up a range of other types of choice functions that have so
far received little to no attention. All of these can be represented in terms of sets of strict
preference orders or—if additional properties are imposed—in terms of sets of strict total
orders, sets of lexicographic probability systems, sets of coherent lower previsions or sets
of linear previsions.
Another important conclusion is that our axiomatisation for general (possibly non-
binary) choice models allows for representations in terms of ‘atomic’ models, which in
themselves represent binary choice. However, this should of course not be taken to mean
that our choice models are essentially binary. Indeed, it follows readily from our repres-
entation theorems that the binary aspects DK of a non-binary choice model K are captured
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by the intersections of the representing sets of desirable options, but the representation is
much more powerful than that, because it also extends to the non-binary aspects of choice.
This distinction between the binary level and the non-binary one also leads us to the
following important words of caution, which are akin to an earlier observation made by
Quaeghebeur [12]. At the binary level, choice is represented by a set of desirable options,
which can—under certain assumptions such as Archimedeanity—be identified with a con-
vex closed set of linear previsions. We have also seen in Theorem 29 that the (binary
and non-binary) aspects of mixing and Archimedean choice can be fully represented by
a closed set of mixing and Archimedean sets of desirable options, each of which is, by
Proposition 24, equivalent to a linear prevision. So, in this case there is a representation
in terms of a set of linear previsions both at the binary level and at the general (binary and
non-binary) level, but these two sets of linear previsions will typically be different, and
they play a very different role. To put it very bluntly: sets of linear previsions Ãa˘ la Walley
[25] should not be confused with sets of linear previsions—credal sets—Ãa˘ la Levi [9].
To conclude, what we have done here, in a very specific sense, is to introduce a way
of dealing with statements of the type ‘there is some option in the option set A that is
strictly preferred to 0’. Axioms such as K0–K4 can then be seen as the logical axioms—for
deriving new statements from old—that govern this language. Our representation theor-
ems provide a semantics for this language in terms of desirability, and they show that the
corresponding logical system is sound and complete.
In our future work on this topic, we intend to investigate how we can let go of the
closedness condition in Theorems 28 and 29. We expect to have to turn to other types of
Archimedeanity; variations on Seidenfeld et al.’s weak Archimedeanity [5, 17] come to
mind. We also intend to show in more detail how the existing work on choice models for
horse lotteries [17] fits nicely within our more general and abstract framework of choice on
linear option spaces. And finally, we intend to further develop conservative inferencemeth-
ods for coherent choice functions, by extending our earlier natural extension results [6] to
the more general setting that we have considered here.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS AND INTERMEDIATE RESULTS
A.1. Terminology and notation used only in the appendix. For any subset V of V we
consider its set of linear combinations, or linear span
span(V ) :=
{
n
∑
k=1
λkuk : n ∈ N,λk ∈R,uk ∈V
}
.
We also consider several operators on—transformations of—the set K of all sets of desir-
able option sets. The first is denoted by Rn(·), and allows us to add smaller option sets by
removing from any option set elements of V0 := {u ∈ V : u  0}:
Rn(K) := {A ∈Q : (∃B ∈ K)B \V0 ⊆ A ⊆ B}, for all K ∈K.
The second is denoted by Rs(·), and allows us to add smaller option sets by removing from
any option set positive combinations from some of its other elements:
Rp(K) := {A ∈Q : (∃B ∈ K)A ⊆ B ⊆ posi(A)}, for all K ∈K.
The final one is denoted by Posi(·)—not to be confused with posi(·)—and defined for all
K ∈K by
Posi(K) :=
{{
n
∑
k=1
λ
u1:n
k uk : u1:n ∈×
n
k=1Ak
}
: n ∈ N,(A1, . . . ,An) ∈ K
n,(
∀u1:n ∈ ×
n
k=1Ak
)
λ
u1:n
1:n > 0
}
, (15)
where we use the notations u1:n and λ
u1:n
1:n for n-tuples of options uk and real numbers λ
u1:n
k ,
k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, so u1:n ∈ V n and λ
u1:n
1:n ∈ R
n. We also use ‘λ u1:n1:n > 0’ as a shorthand for
‘λ u1:nk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and ∑
n
k=1 λ
u1:n
k > 0’.
A.2. Proofs and intermediate results for Section 5.
Proof of Proposition 6. First assume that there is some D ∈D such that K = KD . Then for
all A ∈Q:
A ∈ K⇔ A ∈ KD ⇔ A∩D 6= /0⇔ (∃u ∈ A){u}∩D 6= /0
⇔ (∃u ∈ A){u} ∈ KD ⇔ (∃u ∈ A){u} ∈ K.
It therefore follows from Definition 5 that K is binary.
Furthermore, for any u ∈ V , we find that
u ∈D⇔{u}∩D 6= /0⇔{u} ∈ KD ⇔{u} ∈ K⇔ u ∈DK .
So we find that D is equal to DK , and therefore necessarily unique.
Finally, we assume that K is binary. Let D := DK . Then for all A ∈Q:
A ∈ K⇔ (∃u ∈ A){u} ∈ K⇔ (∃u ∈ A)u ∈ DK ⇔ A∩DK 6= /0⇔ A∩D 6= /0⇔ A ∈ KD ,
where the first equivalence follows from Definition 5 and the fact that K is binary. Hence,
we find that K = KD . 
Corollary 30. A set of desirable option sets K ∈K is binary if and only if KDK = K.
Proof. Immediate consequence of Proposition 6. 
Proposition 31. For any coherent set of desirable option sets K, DK is a coherent set of
desirable options, and KDK ⊆ K.
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Proof. We first prove that DK is coherent, or equivalently, that it satisfies Axioms D1–
D3. For Axiom D1, observe that 0 ∈ DK implies that {0} ∈ K, contradicting Axiom K1.
For Axiom D2, observe that for any u ∈ V , u ∈ DK is equivalent to {u} ∈ K, and take
into account Axiom K2. And, finally, for Axiom D3, observe that u,v ∈ DK implies that
{u},{v} ∈ K, and that Axiom K3 then implies that {λu+ µv} ∈ K, or equivalently, that
λu+ µv ∈ DK , for any choice of (λ ,µ)> 0.
For the last statement, consider any A ∈ KDK , meaning that A∩DK 6= /0. Consider any
u ∈ A ∩DK , then on the one hand u ∈ DK, so {u} ∈ K. But since on the other hand also
u ∈ A, we see that {u} ⊆ A, and therefore Axiom K4 guarantees that A ∈ K. 
Proposition 32. For any set of desirable options D ∈ D, D = DKD . If, moreover, D is
coherent, then KD is a coherent set of desirable option sets.
Proof. For the first statement, simply observe that
u ∈ DKD ⇔ {u} ∈ KD ⇔ {u}∩D 6= /0⇔ u ∈ D, for all u ∈ V .
For the second statement, assume that D is coherent, then we need to prove that KD is
coherent, or equivalently, that it satisfies Axioms K0–K4. For Axiom K0, observe that
A ∩D 6= /0 implies that (A \ {0})∩D 6= /0 because we know from the coherence of D
[AxiomD1] that 0 /∈D. For Axiom K1, observe that Equation (8) implies that {0} ∈ KD ⇔
0∈D, and use Axiom D1. For Axiom K2, observe that {u} ∈ KD is equivalent to u ∈D for
all u ∈ V , and take into account the coherence of D [Axiom D2]. For Axiom K3, consider
any A1,A2 ∈ KD , and let A := {λu,vu+ µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2} for any particular choice of
the (λu,v ,µu,v)> 0 for all u ∈ A1 and v ∈ v2. Then A1∩D 6= /0 and A2∩D 6= /0, so we can
fix any u1 ∈ A1 ∩D and u2 ∈ A2 ∩D. The coherence of D [Axiom D3] then implies that
λu1,v2u1+µu1,v2v2 ∈D, and therefore also A∩D 6= /0, whence indeed A ∈ KD . And, finally,
that KD satisfies Axiom K4 is an immediate consequence of its definition (8). 
Proof of Proposition 8. We begin with the first statement. First, suppose that DK is co-
herent. Proposition 32 then implies that KDK is coherent. Hence, since we know from
Proposition 30 and the assumed binary character of K that K = KDK , we find that K is co-
herent. Next, suppose that K is coherent. Proposition 31 then implies that DK is coherent
as well.
We now turn to the second statement. First, assume that D is coherent, then Proposi-
tion 32 guarantees that KD is coherent too. Next, assume that KD is coherent, then we infer
from Proposition 31 that DKD is coherent, and from Proposition 32 that DKD = D. 
Lemma 33. A coherent set of desirable option sets K is binary if and only if
(∀A ∈ K : |A| ≥ 2)(∃u ∈ A)A \ {u} ∈ K. (16)
Proof. First assume that K is binary. We then know from Corollary 30 that K = KDK ,
implying that A ∈ K⇔ A∩DK 6= /0, for all A ∈Q. Consider any A ∈ K such that |A| ≥ 2.
Then there is some v ∈ A ∩DK such that A = {v}∪ (A \ {v}). But then |A \ {v}| ≥ 1, so
we can consider an element u ∈ A \ {v}. Since clearly v ∈ (A \ {u})∩DK , we see that
(A \ {u})∩DK 6= /0 and therefore, that A \ {u} ∈ K.
Next assume that Equation (16) holds. Because of Corollary 30, it suffices to show that
KDK = K. We infer from Proposition 31 that DK is a coherent set of desirable options,
and that KDK ⊆ K. Assume ex absurdo that KDK ⊂ K, so there is some A ∈ K such that
A /∈ KDK , or equivalently, such that A ∩DK = /0. But then we must have that |A| ≥ 2,
because otherwise A = {v} with v /∈ DK and therefore A = {v} /∈ K, a contradiction. But
then it follows from Equation (16) that there is some u1 ∈ A such that A1 := A \ {u1} ∈ K.
Since it follows from A ∩DK = /0 that also A1 ∩DK = /0, we see that also A1 /∈ KDK . We
can now repeat the same argument with A1 instead of A to find that it must be that |A1| ≥ 2,
so there is some u2 ∈ A1 such that A2 := A1 \ {u2} ∈ K and A2 /∈ KDK . Repeating the same
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argument over and over again will eventually lead to a contradiction with |An| ≥ 2. Hence
it must be that KDK = K. 
A.3. Proofs and intermediate results for Section 6.
Lemma 34. Consider any set of desirable option sets K ∈ K that satisfies Axioms K2
and K3. Consider any A ∈ K. Then for any v ∈ A and any v′ ∈ V such that v  v′, the
option set B := {v′}∪ (A \{v}) obtained by replacing v in A with the dominating option v′
still belongs to K: B ∈ K.
Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that A 6= /0 and that v′ 6= v. Let v′′ :=
v′−v, then v′′ ∈ V≻0, and therefore Axiom K2 implies that {v′′} ∈ K. Applying Axiom K3
for A and {v′′} allows us to infer that {λuu+µuv′′ : u ∈ A} ∈ K for all possible choices of
(λu ,µu) > 0. Choosing (λu ,µu) := (1,0) for all u ∈ A \ {v} and (λv ,µv) := (1,1) yields
in particular that B = {v′}∪ (A \ {v}) ∈ K. 
Lemma 35. Consider any set of desirable option sets K ∈ K that satisfies Axioms K2
and K3. Consider any A ∈ K such that A ∩V0 6= /0 and any v ∈ A ∩V0, and construct
the option set B := {0}∪ (A \ {v}) by replacing v with 0. Then still B ∈ K.
Proof. Immediate consequence of Lemma 34. 
Proposition 36. Rn(K) = K for any coherent set of desirable option sets K ∈K.
Proof. That K ⊆ Rn(K) is an immediate consequence of the definition of the Rn operator.
To prove that Rn(K)⊆ K, consider any A ∈ Rn(K), which means that there is some B ∈ K
such that B \V0 ⊆ A ⊆ B. We need to prove that A ∈ K. Since K satisfies Axiom K4, it
suffices to prove that B \V0 ∈ K.
If B ∩V0 = /0, then B \V0 = B ∈ K. Therefore, without loss of generality, we may
assume that B ∩V0 6= /0. For any u ∈ B ∩V0, Lemma 35 implies that we may replace
u by 0 and still be guaranteed that the resulting set belongs to K. Hence, we can replace
all elements of B∩V0 with 0 and still be guaranteed that the result B′ := {0}∪ (B \V0)
belongs to K. Applying Axiom K0 now guarantees that, indeed, B \V0 = B′ \ {0} ∈
K. 
Proposition 37. Consider any set of desirable option sets K ∈ K. Then Rn(K) satisfies
Axiom K0. Moreover, if K satisfies AxiomsK1, K2, K3 and K4 and does not contain /0, then
so does Rn(K).
Proof. The proof of the first statement is trivial. For the second statement, assume that K
does not contain /0, and satisfies Axioms K1, K2, K3 and K4.
To prove that Rn(K) satisfies Axiom K1 and does not contain /0, assume ex absurdo that
/0∈Rn(K) or {0}∈Rn(K). We then find that there is someB ∈K such that B\V0⊆ /0⊆B
or that there is some B ∈ K such that B \V0 ⊆ {0} ⊆ B. In both cases, it follows that
B ⊆ V0. If B = /0, this contradicts our assumption that K does not contain /0. If B 6= /0,
it follows from Lemma 35 that we can replace every u ∈ B by 0 and still be guaranteed
that the resulting option set {0} belongs to K, contradicting our assumption that K satisfies
Axiom K1.
To prove that Rn(K) satisfies Axiom K2, simply observe that the operator Rn never
removes option sets from a set of desirable option sets, so the option sets {u}, u ∈ V≻0,
which belong to K by Axiom K2, will also belong to the larger Rn(K).
To prove that Rn(K) satisfies Axiom K3, consider any A1,A2 ∈ Rn(K), meaning that
there are B1,B2 ∈ K such that B1 \V0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ B1 and B2 \V0⊆ A2 ⊆ B2. For any u ∈ A1
and v ∈ A2, we choose (λu,v ,µu,v)> 0, and let
A := {λu,vu+ µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2}.
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Then we have to prove that A ∈Rn(K). Since K satisfies AxiomK3, we infer from B1,B2 ∈
K that
C :={λu,vu+ µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2}
∪{1u+ 0v : u ∈ B1 \A1,v ∈ B2}∪{0u+ 1v : u ∈ A1,v ∈ B2 \A2}
=A∪{u : u ∈ B1 \A1,v ∈ B2}∪{v : u ∈ A1,v ∈ B2 \A2}
belongs to K as well. Furthermore, since B1 \V0 ⊆ A1 and B2 \V0 ⊆ A2 imply that
B1 \A1 ⊆ V0 and B2 \A2 ⊆ V0, we see that
{u : u ∈ B1 \A1,v ∈ B2}∪{v : u ∈ A1,v ∈ B2 \A2} ⊆ V0.
Hence,C \V0 ⊆ A ⊆C. SinceC ∈ K, this implies that, indeed, A ∈ Rn(K).
Finally, to prove that Rn(K) satisfies Axiom K4, consider any A1 ∈ Rn(K) and any
A2 ∈ Q such that A1 ⊆ A2. We need to prove that A2 ∈ K. That A1 ∈ Rn(K) implies
that there is some B1 ∈ K such that B1 \V0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ B1. Let B2 := B1 ∪ (A2 \A1), then
B1 ⊆ B2 and therefore also B2 ∈ K, because K satisfies Axiom K4. We now infer from
B1 \V0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ B1 that
B2 \V0 ⊆ (B1 \V0)∪ (A2 \A1)⊆ A1∪ (A2 \A1)⊆ B1∪ (A2 \A1).
Since A1∪(A2\A1) =A2, this allows us to conclude that B2\V0⊆A2⊆B2, and therefore,
since B2 ∈ K, that, indeed, A2 ∈ Rn(K). 
Lemma 38. Let A,B ∈Q be option sets, and consider any non-zero uo ∈ V . Then there
are αu , u ∈ A such that u−αuuo /∈ B and u−αuuo 6= v−αvuo for all u,v in A.
Proof. Partition the finite set A into the finite number of disjoint subsets Ak of options u
belonging to the same affine space {u+βuo : β ∈R}= u+span{uo} parallel to span{uo}.
When Ak has nk elements, choose nk different options in the corresponding affine space that
are not in the finite B, which is always possible. 
Lemma 39. Consider a coherent set of desirable option sets K ∈K and any Ao ∈ K such
that |Ao| ≥ 2 and Ao \ {u} /∈ K for all u ∈ Ao. Choose any uo ∈ Ao and let
K∗∗ :=
{{
λvv+ µvuo : v ∈ B
}
: B ∈ K,(∀v ∈ B)(λv ,µv)> 0
}
. (17)
Then K∗ := Rn(K∗∗) is a coherent set of desirable option sets that is a superset of K and
contains {uo}. Furthermore, {uo} /∈ K and uo 6 0.
Proof of Lemma 39. To prove that {uo} /∈ K, assume ex absurdo that {uo} ∈ K. Since
|Ao \ {uo}| ≥ 1, we can pick any element v ∈ Ao \ {uo}, and then {uo} ⊆ Ao \ {v} and
therefore Ao \{v} ∈ K by Axiom K4, contradicting the assumptions. To prove that uo 6 0,
assume ex absurdo that uo ∈ V0, then we infer that also Ao \{uo} ∈ K [use Proposition 36
and the coherence ofK], contradicting the assumptions. To prove that {uo}∈K∗, it suffices
to notice that {uo} = {0v+ 1uo : v ∈ Ao} ∈ K∗∗, whence also {uo} ∈ K∗. Similarly, since
K∗∗ is clearly a superset of K, the same is true for K∗.
It only remains to prove, therefore, that K∗ is coherent. To this end, we intend to show
that the set of desirable option sets K∗∗ satisfies Axioms K1, K2, K3 and K4 and that
/0 /∈ K∗∗. The coherence of K∗ will then be an immediate consequence of Proposition 37.
For Axiom K1, assume ex absurdo that {0} ∈ K∗∗, meaning that there is some B ∈ K
and, for all v ∈ B, some choice of (λv ,µv) > 0, such that {λvv+ µvuo : v ∈ B} = {0}.
Hence, B 6= /0 and λvv+ µvuo = 0 for all v ∈ B.
Recall that we already know that uo 6= 0. For any v ∈ B, λvv+ µvuo = 0 implies that
λv > 0, because otherwise, since (λv ,µv)> 0, λv = 0 would imply that µv > 0 and therefore
uo = 0, a contradiction. Hence, for all v ∈ B, v = −δvuo with δv :=
µv
λv
≥ 0. Now let
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(κu,v ,ρu,v) := (1,0) for all u ∈ Ao \ {uo} and v ∈ B, and let (κuo,v ,ρuo,v) := (δv ,1) for all
v ∈ B. Then
{κu,vu+ρu,vv : u ∈ Ao,v ∈ B}= {u : u ∈ Ao \ {uo},v ∈ B}∪{δvuo+ v : v ∈ B}
= {u : u ∈ Ao \ {uo},v ∈ B}∪{0: v ∈ B}
= {0}∪ (Ao \ {uo}),
where the last equality follows from B 6= /0. However, since Ao ∈ K and B ∈ K, the coher-
ence of K [Axiom K3] implies that {κu,vu+ρu,vv : u ∈ Ao,v ∈ B} ∈ K. We therefore find
that {0}∪ (Ao \ {uo}) ∈ K. The coherence of K now guarantees that Ao \ {uo} ∈ K [use
Axiom K0 if {0} /∈ Ao \ {uo}], contradicting the assumptions.
For Axiom K2, consider any u ∈ V≻0. Then {u} ∈ K because K satisfies Axiom K2.
Since K∗∗ is a superset of K, we see that, indeed, also {u} ∈ K∗∗.
For Axiom K4, consider any A1 ∈ K∗∗ and any A2 ∈Q such that A1 ⊆ A2, then we must
prove that also A2 ∈ K∗∗. Since A1 ∈ K∗∗, we know that there is some B1 ∈ K and, for all
v ∈ B1, some choice of (λv ,µv)> 0, such that
A1 = {λvv+ µvuo : v ∈ B1}.
For every u ∈ A2 \A1, we now choose some real αu > 0 such that u−αuuo /∈ B1 and such
that, for all u,u′ ∈ A2 \A1, u−αuuo 6= u′−αu′uo. Since uo 6= 0 and A1, A2 and B1 are
finite, this is always possible, by Lemma 38. Let
B2 := B1∪{u−αuuo : u ∈ A2 \A1}
and, for each v ∈ B2 \B1, let uv be the unique element of A2 \A1 for which v= uv−αuv uo,
and let (λv ,µv) := (1,αuv )> 0. We then see that
A2 = A1∪ (A2 \A1)
= {λvv+ µvuo : v ∈ B1}∪{u−αuuo+αuuo : u ∈ A2 \A1}
= {λvv+ µvuo : v ∈ B1}∪{v+αuvuo : v ∈ B2 \B1}
= {λvv+ µvuo : v ∈ B2}.
Furthermore, since B1 ∈ K and B1 ⊆ B2, it follows from the coherence of K and Axiom K4
that B2 ∈ K. Hence, indeed, A2 ∈ K∗∗.
For Axiom K3, consider any A1,A2 ∈ K∗∗ and, for all u1 ∈ A1 and u2 ∈ A2, any choice
of (αu1,u2 ,βu1,u2)> 0. Then we must prove that
C := {αu1,u2u1+βu1,u2u2 : u1 ∈ A1,u2 ∈ A2} ∈ K
∗∗.
Since A1,A2 ∈ K∗∗, there are B1,B2 ∈ K and, for all v1 ∈ B1 and v2 ∈ B2, some choices of
(λ1,v1 ,µ1,v1)> 0 and (λ2,v2 ,µ2,v2)> 0, such that
A1 = {λ1,v1v1+ µ1,v1uo : v1 ∈ B1} and A2 = {λ2,v2v2+ µ2,v2uo : v2 ∈ B2}.
Now fix any v1 ∈ B1 and v2 ∈ B2, and let (α ′v1,v2 ,β
′
v1,v2
) := (αu1,u2 ,βu1,u2) > 0, with u1 :=
λ1,v1v1+ µ1,v1uo and u2 := λ2,v2v2+ µ2,v2uo. Then
C = {α ′v1,v2(λ1,v1v1+ µ1,v1uo)+β
′
v1,v2
(λ2,v2v2+ µ2,v2uo) : v1 ∈ B1,v2 ∈ B2}
We consider two cases. If α ′v1,v2λ1,v1 +β
′
v1,v2
λ2,v2 > 0, we let
(κv1,v2 ,ρv1,v2) := (α
′
v1,v2
λ1,v1 ,β
′
v1,v2
λ2,v2)> 0,
(γv1,v2 ,δv1,v2) := (1,α
′
v1,v2
µ1,v1 +β
′
v1,v2
µ2,v2)> 0.
If α ′v1,v2λ1,v1 +β
′
v1,v2
λ2,v2 = 0, we let
(κv1,v2 ,ρv1,v2) := (1,1)> 0,
(γv1,v2 ,δv1,v2) := (0,α
′
v1,v2
µ1,v1 +β
′
v1,v2
µ2,v2)> 0.
In both cases, we find that
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γv1,v2(κv1,v2v1+ρv1,v2v2)+ δv1,v2uo
= α ′v1,v2(λ1,v1v1+ µ1,v1uo)+β
′
v1,v2
(λ2,v2v2+ µ2,v2uo) ∈C. (18)
Now let
B :=
{
κv1,v2v1+ρv1,v2v2 : v1 ∈ B1,v2 ∈ B2
}
.
Then clearly, for all w ∈ B, there are v1 ∈ B1 and v2 ∈ B2 such that w = κv1,v2v1+ρv1,v2v2.
However, there could be multiple such pairs. We choose any one such pair and denote its
two elements by v1,w and v2,w , respectively. Using this notation, we now define the set
C′ :=
{
γv1,w ,v2,ww+ δv1,w ,v2,w uo : w ∈ B
}
.
Since B1,B2 ∈K, the coherence of K [Axiom K3] implies that B ∈ K, which in turn implies
thatC′ ∈ K∗∗. Also, since
C′ =
{
γv1,w ,v2,ww+ δv1,w ,v2,wuo : w ∈ B
}
=
{
γv1,w ,v2,w
(
κv1,w ,v2,w v1,w +ρv1,w ,v2,w v2,w
)
+ δv1,w ,v2,w uo : w ∈ B
}
,
we infer from Equation (18) that C′ ⊆C. Since we have already proved that K∗∗ satisfies
Axiom K4, this implies that, indeed,C ∈ K∗∗.
It therefore now only remains to prove that /0 /∈ K∗∗. Observe that that /0 /∈ K because
K is coherent [combine Axioms K1 and K4]. It therefore follows from Equation (17) that,
indeed, /0 /∈ K∗∗. 
Proposition 40. Any non-binary coherent set of desirable option sets K is strictly domin-
ated by some other coherent set of desirable option sets.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary coherent non-binary set of desirable option sets K. We infer
from Lemma 33 that there is some Ao ∈ K such that |Ao| ≥ 2 and Ao \ {u} /∈ K for all
u ∈ Ao. Consider any uo ∈ Ao and let K∗ := Rn(K∗∗), with K∗∗ as in Equation (17). It then
follows from Lemma 39 that K∗ is a coherent set of desirable option sets that is a superset
of K and contains {uo}, and that {uo} /∈ K. Hence, K ⊂ K∗. 
Lemma 41. For any non-empty chain K in K, its union Ko :=
⋃
K is a coherent set of
desirable option sets.
Proof. For Axiom K0, consider any A ∈ Ko. Then there is some K′ ∈K such that A ∈ K′,
and since K′ is coherent, this implies that A \ {0} ∈ K′ ⊆ Ko.
For Axiom K1, simply observe that since {0} belongs to no element of K [since they
are all coherent], it cannot belong to their union Ko.
For Axiom K2, consider any u ≻ 0 and any K ∈K , then we know that {u} ∈ K [since
K is coherent], and therefore also {u} ∈ Ko, since K ⊆ Ko.
For Axiom K3, consider any A1,A2 ∈ Ko and, for all u ∈ A1 and v ∈ A2, choose some
(λu,v ,µu,v)> 0. Since A1,A2 ∈ Ko, we know that there are K1,K2 ∈K such that A1 ∈ K1
and A2 ∈ K2. Since K is a chain, we can assume without loss of generality that K1 ⊆ K2,
and therefore {A1,A2} ⊆ K2. Since K2 is coherent, it follows that {λu,vu + µu,vv : u ∈
A1,v ∈ A2} ∈ K2 ⊆ Ko.
And finally, for Axiom K4, consider any A1 ∈ Ko and any A2 ∈ Q such that A1 ⊆ A2.
Then we know that there is some K ∈K such that A1 ∈K. SinceK is coherent, this implies
that also A2 ∈ K ⊆ Ko. 
Lemma 42. For any coherent set of desirable option sets K ∈ K and any set of desirable
option sets K∗ ∈K such that K∩K∗ = /0, the partially ordered set
↑K := {K′ ∈K : K ⊆ K′ and K′∩K∗ = /0}
has a maximal element.
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Proof. We will use Zorn’s Lemma to establish the existence of a maximal element. So
consider any (non-empty) chain K in ↑K, then we must prove that K has an upper bound
in ↑K. Since Ko :=
⋃
K is clearly an upper bound, we are done if we can prove that
Ko ∈ ↑K.
That Ko ∩K∗ = /0 follows from the fact that K′∩K∗ = /0 for every K′ ∈K ⊆ ↑K. That
Ko is a coherent set of desirable option sets follows from Lemma 41. 
Proposition 43. Every coherent set of desirable option sets K ∈ K is dominated by some
binary coherent set of desirable option sets.
Proof. Lemma 42 with K∗ = /0 tells us that the partially ordered set {K′ ∈ K : K ⊆ K′}
has some maximal element Kˆ. Assume ex absurdo that Kˆ is non-binary. It then follows
from Proposition 40 that Kˆ is strictly dominated by a coherent set of desirable option sets,
meaning that there is some K∗ ∈ K such that Kˆ ⊂ K∗, and therefore also K ⊂ K∗. Hence
also K∗ ∈ {K′ ∈ K : K ⊆ K′}, which contradicts that Kˆ is a maximal element of that set.
We conclude that Kˆ is indeed binary. 
Theorem 44. Every coherent set of desirable option sets K ∈ K is dominated by at least
one binary coherent set of desirable option sets: D(K) := {D ∈D : K⊆KD} 6= /0. Moreover,
K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D(K)}.
Proof. Let Ko be any coherent set of desirable option sets. We prove that D(Ko) := {D ∈
D : Ko ⊆ KD} 6= /0 and that Ko =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D(Ko)}.
For the first statement, recall from Proposition 43 that Ko is dominated by a binary
coherent set of desirable option sets Kˆ. Proposition 6 therefore implies that Kˆ = KD , with
D = DKˆ . Furthermore, because Kˆ is coherent, Proposition 8 implies that D is coherent,
whence D ∈ D. Since Ko ⊆ Kˆ = KD , we see that DKˆ ∈ D(Ko) := {D ∈ D : Ko ⊆ KD} 6= /0.
For the second statement, it is obvious thatKo⊆
⋂
{KD : D ∈D(Ko)}, so we concentrate
on the proof of the converse inclusion. Assume ex absurdo that Ko ⊂
⋂
{KD : D ∈D(Ko)},
so there is some option set Bo ∈ Q such that Bo /∈ Ko and Bo ∈ KD for all D ∈ D(Ko), so
Bo 6= /0. Then Bo \V0 /∈ Ko [use the coherence of Ko and Axiom K4] and Bo \V0 ∈ KD
for all D ∈ D(Ko) [use the coherence of KD—which follows from Proposition 32 and the
coherence of D—and Proposition 36], so we may assume without loss of generality that
Bo has no non-positive options: Bo∩V0 = /0.
The partially ordered set ↑K∗o := {K ∈K : Ko ⊆ K and Bo /∈ K} is non-empty because it
contains Ko. Furthermore, due to Lemma 42 [applied for K = Ko and K∗ = {Bo}], it has
at least one maximal element. If we can prove that any such maximal element Kˆ is binary,
then we know from Propositions 6 and 8 that there is some coherent set of desirable options
Do = DKˆ such that Ko ⊆ KDo—and therefore Do ∈D(Ko)—and Bo /∈ KDo , a contradiction.
To prove that all maximal elements of ↑K∗o are binary, it suffices to prove that any non-
binary element of ↑K∗o is strictly dominated in that set, which is what we now set out to
do.
So consider any non-binary element K of ↑K∗o , so in particular K ∈ K, Ko ⊆ K and
Bo /∈ K. Since K is non-binary, it follows from Lemma 33 that there is some Ao ∈ K such
that |Ao| ≥ 2 and Ao \ {u} /∈ K for all u ∈ Ao. The partially ordered set {A ∈ K : Bo ⊆ A}
contains Ao ∪Bo [because Ao ∈ K and because K satisfies Axiom K4] and therefore has
some minimal (non-dominating) element B∗ below it, so B∗ ∈ K and Bo ⊆ B∗ ⊆ Ao∪Bo.
Let us first summarise what we know about this minimal element B∗. It is impossible
that B∗ ⊆ Bo because otherwise Bo = B∗ ∈ K, a contradiction. Hence B∗ \Bo 6= /0, so we
can fix some element uo in B∗ \Bo ⊆ Ao. Since Bo ⊆ B∗ \{uo} but B∗ \{uo} ⊂ B∗, it must
be that B∗ \ {uo} /∈ K, by the definition of a minimal element. Observe that B∗ 6= /0.
Let K∗ := Rn(K∗∗), with K∗∗ as in Equation (17). Since uo ∈ Ao, it then follows from
Lemma 39 that K∗ is a coherent set of desirable option sets that is a superset of K—and
therefore also of Ko—and contains {uo}, and that {uo} /∈ K and uo 6 0. Hence, it follows
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that K ⊂ K∗. If we can now prove that Bo /∈ K∗ and therefore K∗ ∈ ↑K∗o , we are done,
because then K is indeed strictly dominated by K∗ in ↑K∗o .
Assume therefore ex absurdo that Bo ∈ K∗ = Rn(K∗∗). Taking into account Equa-
tion (17), this implies that there are C ∈ K and (λv ,µv) > 0 for all v ∈ C, such that
{bv : v ∈ C} \V0 ⊆ Bo ⊆ {bv : v ∈ C}, where, for all v ∈ C, bv := λvv+ µvuo. Given
our assumption that Bo∩V0 = /0, this also implies that {bv : v ∈C}\Bo ⊆ V0. Now let
C1 := {v ∈ C : bv ∈ Bo} and C2 := {v ∈ C : bv /∈ Bo}. Then C1 6= /0 [because Bo 6= /0] and
{bv : v ∈C1}=Bo. Consider now any v ∈C2. Then bv /∈Bo. Since {bv : v ∈C}\Bo⊆V0,
this implies that bv = λvv+µvuo 0. Hence, we must have that λv > 0, because otherwise
µvuo  0 with µv > 0, and therefore also uo  0, contradicting what we inferred earlier
from Lemma 39. So we find that
v  −
µv
λv
uo for all v ∈C2.
Consequently, and becauseC1∪C2 =C ∈ K, we infer from Lemma 34 that
C′ :=C1∪
{
−
µv
λv
uo : v ∈C2
}
∈ K.
Let C3 :=C′ \C1. Then for all v ∈C3, there is some γv ≥ 0 such that v = −γvuo. Now let
(αuo,v ,βuo,v) := (µv ,λv) for all v ∈C1 and (αuo,v ,βuo,v) := (γv ,1) for all v ∈C3 and, for all
u ∈ B∗ \ {uo} and v ∈C′, let (αu,v ,βu,v) := (1,0). Then
{αu,vu+βu,vv : u ∈ B
∗,v ∈C′}
= {µvuo+λvv : v ∈C1}∪{γvuo+ v : v ∈C3}∪{u : u ∈ B
∗ \ {uo},v ∈C
′}
= {bv : v ∈C1}∪{0: v ∈C3}∪{u : u ∈ B
∗ \ {uo}}
= Bo∪{0: v ∈C3}∪ (B
∗ \ {uo})
= (B∗ \ {uo})∪{0: v ∈C3},
where the second equality holds becauseC′ ∈ K and Axioms K1 and K4 imply that /0 6=C′,
and where the fourth equality holds because Bo ⊆ B∗ \{uo}. Since B∗ ∈ K andC′ ∈ K, we
can now invoke Axiom K3 to find that
B∗ \ {uo}∪{0: v ∈C3}= {αu,vu+βu,vv : u ∈ B
∗,v ∈C′} ∈ K.
If C3 = /0, we find that B∗ \ {uo} ∈ K, a contradiction. If C3 6= /0, we find that {0} ∪
B∗ \ {uo} ∈ K. If 0 ∈ B∗ \ {uo}, then we get that B∗ \ {uo} ∈ K, a contradiction. And
if 0 /∈ B∗ \ {uo}, then we can still derive from Axiom K0 that B∗ \ {uo} ∈ K, again a
contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 9. If the set of desirable option sets K is coherent, we infer from The-
orem 44 that D(K) := {D ∈ D : K ⊆ KD} 6= /0 and K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D(K)}. This clearly
implies that there is at least one non-empty set D ⊆D of coherent sets of desirable options
such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}, namely the set D(K). Furthermore, for any non-empty set
D ⊆ D of coherent sets of desirable options such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D}, we clearly
have that K ⊆ KD for all D ∈ D . Since D ⊆ D, this implies that D ⊆ D(K). So D(K) is
indeed the largest such set.
It remains to prove the ‘if’ part of the statement. So consider any non-empty set D ⊆D
of coherent sets of desirable options such that K=
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}. For anyD ∈D ⊆D, it
then follows from Proposition 32 that KD is coherent. Because Axioms K0-K4 are trivially
preserved under taking arbitrary non-empty intersections, it follows that K is coherent. 
A.4. Proofs and intermediate results for Section 4.
Proposition 45. Posi(K) = K for any coherent set of desirable option sets K ∈K.
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Proof of Proposition 45. That K⊆ Posi(K), is an immediate consequence of the definition
of the Posi operator, and holds for any set of desirable option sets, coherent or not. Indeed,
consider any A ∈ K, then it is not difficult to see that A ∈ Posi(K): choose n := 1, A1 :=
A ∈ K1, and λ u1:11:1 := 1 for all u1:1 ∈×
1
k=1A1 = A in the definition of the Posi operator.
For the converse inclusion, that Posi(K)⊆K, we use the coherence of K, and in particu-
lar the representation result of Theorem 44, which allows us to write that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈
D and K ⊆ KD}.
So, if we fix any D ∈ D such that K ⊆ KD , then it clearly suffices to prove that also
Posi(K) ⊆ KD . Consider, therefore, any A ∈ Posi(K), meaning that there are n ∈ N,
(A1, . . . ,An) ∈ K
n and, for all u1:n ∈×nk=1Ak, some choice of λ
u1:n
1:n > 0 such that
A =
{
n
∑
k=1
λ
u1:n
k uk : u1:n ∈ ×
n
k=1Ak
}
.
For any k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, since Ak ∈ K ⊆ KD , we know that Ak ∩D 6= /0, so we can fix some
vk ∈ Ak∩D. Then, on the one hand, we see that ∑
n
k=1 λ
v1:n
k vk ∈ A. On the other hand, since
λ
v1:n
1:n > 0, we infer from Axiom D3 [by applying it multiple times] that also ∑
n
k=1 λ
v1:n
k vk ∈
D. Therefore, we find that A∩D 6= /0, or equivalently, that A ∈ KD . Since A ∈ Posi(K) was
chosen arbitrarily, it follows that, indeed, Posi(K)⊆ KD . 
Proof of Proposition 4. First, suppose that K satisfies Axioms K0–K4, then we show that
R satisfies Axioms R0–R4.
Axiom R0 follows even without Axioms K0–K4, from the chain of equivalences
u ∈ R(A)⇔ u ∈ R(A∪{u})⇔ A− u ∈ K⇔ (A− u)− 0∈ K
⇔ 0 ∈ R((A− u)∪{0})⇔ 0 ∈ R(A− u), for all A ∈Q,
where the first and last equivalences follow because u ∈ A and the second and fourth equi-
valences follow from Equation (5). We now concentrate on Axioms R1–R4.
R1. It is obvious from R( /0) ⊆ /0 that R( /0) = /0. For any non-empty option set A ∈ Q,
assume ex absurdo that R(A) = A. For all u ∈ A, it then follows from Equation (5) that
A− u ∈ K. So if we denote A by {v1, . . . ,vn}, with n ∈ N, and let vℓk := vℓ− vk, then we
find that for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
Ak := {vℓk : ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,n}} ∈ K.
Proposition 45 and Equation (15) now tell us that, for any choice of the λ u1:n1:n > 0 in Equa-
tion (15), the option set {
n
∑
k=1
λ
u1:n
k uk : u1:n ∈ ×
n
k=1Ak
}
∈ K.
So if we can show that for any u1:n ∈ ×nk=1Ak we can always choose the λ
u1:n
1:n > 0 in such
a way that ∑nk=1 λ
u1:n
k uk = 0, we will have that {0} ∈ K, contradicting Axiom K1. We now
set out to do this.
For any k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, since uk ∈ Ak, there is a unique ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that uk = vℓk.
Let φ(k) be this unique index, so uk = vφ(k)k. For the resulting map φ : {1, . . . ,n} →
{1, . . . ,n}, we now consider the sequence—φ -orbit—in {1, . . . ,n}:
1,φ(1),φ2(1), . . . ,φ r(1), . . .
Because φ can assume at most n different values, this sequence must be periodic, and its
fundamental (smallest) period p cannot be larger than n, so 1≤ p≤ n and 1= φ p(1). Now
let λ u1:nφ r(1) := 1 for r = 0, . . . , p− 1, and let all other components be zero, then indeed
n
∑
k=1
λ
u1:n
k uk =
p−1
∑
r=0
vφ r+1(1)φ r(1) =
p−1
∑
r=0
(vφ r+1(1)− vφ r(1)) = 0.
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R2. Consider any u ∈ V≻0, so {u} ∈ K [use K2]. Since {u} = {u}− 0, Equation (5)
guarantees that, indeed, 0 ∈ R({0,u}).
R3. Since 0 ∈ R(A1 ∪ {0}) and 0 ∈ R(A2 ∪ {0}), it follows from Equation (5) that
A1,A2 ∈ K. Axiom K3 therefore implies that {λu,vu+ µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2} ∈ K. A final
application of Equation (5) now tells us that, indeed,
0 ∈ R({λu,vu+ µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2}∪{0}).
R4. Consider A1,A2 ∈Q and u ∈A1, and assume that u ∈ R(A1) and A1⊆ A2. Since u ∈
A1, Equation (5) then implies that A1−u ∈K, and by Axiom K4, therefore also A2−u ∈ K,
which in turn implies [again using Equation (5)] that u ∈ R(A2∪{u}), and therefore, since
u ∈ A1 ⊆ A2, that u ∈ R(A2).
Next, we suppose that R satisfies Axioms R1–R4, and show that K then satisfies Ax-
ioms K0–K4. Again, the first axiom [Axiom K0 in this case] holds without imposing any
conditions on R. To see this, it suffices to consider the following chain of equivalences
A ∈ K⇔ 0 ∈ R(A∪{0})⇔ 0 ∈ R((A \ {0})∪{0})⇔ A \ {0} ∈ K, for all A ∈Q,
where the first and third equivalences follow from Equation (5), and the second one from
the trivial fact that A ∪ {0} = (A \ {0}) ∪ {0}. We therefore now concentrate on Ax-
ioms K1–K4.
K1. By Equation (5), {0}∈K is equivalent to 0∈R({0}) , which contradicts Axiom R1.
K2. Consider any u ∈ V≻0, so 0∈ R({0,u}) by Axiom R2. Equation (5) now guarantees
that, indeed, {u} ∈ K.
K3. This is a straightforward translation, using Equation (5).
K4. Consider any A1,A2 ∈ Q, and assume that A1 ⊆ A2 and A2 ∈ K. Then it follows
from Equation (5) that 0∈ R(A1∪{0}), so Axiom R4 guarantees that also 0∈ R(A2∪{0}).
Equation (5) then leads to the conclusion that, indeed, A2 ∈ K. 
A.5. Proofs and intermediate results for Section 7.
Proof of Proposition 12. Since for all u ∈ V \ {0},
(u ∈ D or − u ∈ D)⇔{u,−u}∩D 6= /0⇔ {u,−u} ∈ KD ,
this result is an immediate consequence of Definitions 10 and 11, and Proposition 8. 
Proof of Theorem 13. First assume that K is total. Since K is then in particular coherent,
we know from Theorem 9 that there is some non-empty set D ⊆ D of coherent sets of
desirable options such that K=
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}, and that the largest such set D is D(K) :=
{D ∈ D : K ⊆ KD}. Consider any such set D . Then for all D ∈ D , since K ⊆ KD , the
totality of K implies that KD is total, and therefore, because of Proposition 12, that D is
total as well. Hence, D ⊆ DT and therefore also D(K) = DT(K). All this allows us to
conclude that there is some non-empty set D ⊆ DT of total sets of desirable options such
that K=
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}, and that the largest such set D is DT(K) := {D ∈DT : K ⊆KD}.
To prove the ‘if’ part of the statement, consider any non-empty set D ⊆DT of total sets
of desirable options such that K=
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}. For everyD ∈D ⊆DT, it then follows
from Proposition 12 that KD is total. Because Axioms K0-K4 and KT are trivially preserved
under taking arbitrary non-empty intersections, this implies that K is total as well. 
Proof of Proposition 14. First suppose that K is total. Since K is then in particular coher-
ent, we know from Proposition 4 that R is coherent. Consider now any u ∈ V \ {0}, so
{u,−u} ∈ K by Axiom KT. Equation (5) then guarantees that, indeed, 0 ∈ R({0,u,−u}.
Next, suppose that R is coherent and satisfies Axiom RT. Since R is coherent, we
know from Proposition 4 that K is coherent too. Consider now any u ∈ V \ {0}, so 0 ∈
R({0,u,−u}) by Axiom RT. Equation (5) then guarantees that, indeed, {u,−u} ∈ K. 
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A.6. Proofs and intermediate results for Section 8.
Lemma 46. Consider any set of desirable option sets K ∈ K that satisfies Axiom K3.
Consider any A ∈ K and, for all u ∈ A, some λu > 0. Then also {λuu : u ∈ A} ∈ K.
Proof. Axiom K3 for A and A allows us to infer that {λu,vu+ µu,vv : u,v ∈ A} ∈ K for all
possible choices of (λu,v ,µu,v)> 0. Choosing (λu,v ,µu,v) := (λu ,0) for all u,v ∈ A, yields
in particular that, indeed, {λuu : u ∈ A} ∈ K. 
Proof of Proposition 15. First assume that R is coherent and mixing. Proposition 4 then
tells us that K is coherent. We will prove that K also satisfies Axioms KM and K′M. Since
KM clearly implies K′M, it suffices to prove the former. So consider any A,B ∈ Q such
that B ∈ K and A ⊆ B ⊆ posi(A). For every u ∈ B \A, since u ∈ posi(A), it follows from
Equations (10) and (11) that there is some λu > 0 such that λuu ∈ conv(A). Furthermore,
for every u ∈ A, if we let λu := 1, then also λuu ∈ conv(A). Let B˜ := {λuu : u ∈ B}, then,
clearly, A ⊆ B˜ ⊆ conv(A). Furthermore, since B ∈ K, it follows from Lemma 46 that also
B˜ ∈ K. In order to prove that then also A ∈ K, observe that A ⊆ B˜ ⊆ conv(A) implies that
A∪{0} ⊆ B˜∪{0} ⊆ conv(A∪{0}), so Axiom RM tells us that
R
(
B˜∪{0}
)
∩ (A∪{0})⊆ R(A∪{0}). (19)
Since B˜ ∈K is equivalent to B˜−0∈K, we infer from Equation (5) that 0∈R(B˜∪{0}), and
since also 0 ∈ (A ∪{0}), we infer from Equation (19) that 0 ∈ R(A ∪{0}). Equation (5)
then leads us to conclude that, indeed, A = A− 0 ∈ K.
Next, we assume that K is coherent and satisfies KM or K′M. Since KM implies K
′
M, it
follows that K is coherent and satisfies K′M. Proposition 4 already tells us that then R is
coherent, so we are left to prove that R satisfies RM. So, consider any A,B ∈Q such that
A ⊆ B ⊆ conv(A). In order to prove that R(B)∩A ⊆ R(A), consider any u ∈ R(B)∩A.
Then also u ∈ B, so B = B ∪{u}, and therefore u ∈ R(B ∪ {u}), whence B− u ∈ K by
Equation (5). Since it follows from the assumptions that also A−u⊆ B−u⊆ conv(A−u),
it follows from Axiom K′M that A−u ∈ K, so Equation (5) and A = A∪{u} guarantee that,
indeed, u ∈ R(A). 
Proof of Proposition 18. First, assume that D ∈ DM. Then D is in particular coherent, so
KD is coherent too, by Proposition 8. To prove that KD ∈KM, it therefore suffices to show
that KD satisfies KM. So consider any A,B ∈ Q such that B ∈ KD and A ⊆ B ⊆ posi(A),
then we have to prove that also A ∈ KD . Since B ∈ KD , it follows from Equation (8) that
B ∩D 6= /0 and therefore, since B ⊆ posi(A), that posi(A)∩D 6= /0. We can now use the
assumption that D satisfies DM to infer that also A ∩D 6= /0, which in turn implies that,
indeed, A ∈ KD , again because of Equation (8).
Conversely, assume thatKD ∈KM. ThenKD is in particular coherent, and therefore so is
D, by Proposition 8. To prove thatD ∈DM, it therefore suffices to show thatD satisfies DM.
Consider, therefore, any A ∈Q such that posi(A)∩D 6= /0, then we have to prove that also
A ∩D 6= /0. It follows from posi(A)∩D 6= /0 that there is some uo ∈ posi(A)∩D. Let
B := A∪{uo}, then clearly A ⊆ B ⊆ posi(A). Also, B∩D 6= /0, so Equation (8) guarantees
that B ∈ KD . We then infer from the assumption that KD satisfies KM that also A ∈ KD ,
whence, indeed, A∩D 6= /0, by Equation (8). 
Lemma 47. Consider any set of desirable option sets K ∈ K that satisfies Axiom K3.
Consider any A ∈ K such that {w,λw} ⊆ A for some w ∈ V \ {0} and λ > 0 such that
λ 6= 1. Then A \ {w} ∈ K.
Proof. Axiom K3 for A and A allows us to infer that {λu,vu+ µu,vv : u,v ∈ A} ∈ K for all
possible choices of (λu,v ,µu,v)> 0. Choosing (λu,v ,µu,v) := (1,0) for all u ∈ A \{w} and
(λw,v ,µw,v) := (λ ,0), for all v ∈ A, yields in particular that A \ {w} ∈ K. 
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Proposition 48. Consider any set of desirable option sets K ∈K. ThenRp(K) satisfiesKM.
Moreover, if K satisfies K0, K1, K2, K3 and K4 , then so does Rp(K).
Proof. We begin with the first statement. Consider any A1 ∈ Rp(K) and any A ∈ Q such
that A ⊆ A1 ⊆ posi(A). Then, on the one hand, posi(A) = posi(A1), and on the other hand,
there is some B1 ∈ K such that A1 ⊆ B1 ⊆ posi(A1). Hence A ⊆ A1 ⊆ B1 ⊆ posi(A1) =
posi(A), and therefore indeed A ∈ Rp(K).
For the second statement, assume that K satisfies K0, K1, K2, K3, and K4.
To prove that Rp(K) satisfies K0, consider any A ∈ Rp(K), meaning that there is some
B ∈ K such that A ⊆ B ⊆ posi(A). To see that A \ {0} ∈ Rp(K), it suffices to show that
B \ {0} ⊆ posi(A \ {0}), because clearly A \ {0} ⊆ B \ {0}. Consider any element u of
B \ {0}, then it follows from the assumption B ⊆ posi(A) that u = ∑nk=1 λkuk, with n≥ 1,
different uk ∈ A, and λk > 0. Even if uk = 0 for some k, we still find that u ∈ posi(A \{0}).
To prove that Rp(K) satisfies K1, assume ex absurdo that {0} ∈ Rp(K), so there is some
B ∈ K such that {0} ⊆ B ⊆ posi({0}), or in other words, such that B = {0}, contradicting
that K satisfies K1.
To prove that Rp(K) satisfies K2, simply observe that the operator Rp never removes
option sets from a set of desirable option sets, so the option sets {u}, u ≻ 0 that belong to
K by K2, will also belong to the larger Rp(K).
To prove that Rp(K) satisfies K3, consider any A1,A2 ∈ Rp(K), meaning that there are
B1,B2 ∈ K such that A1 ⊆ B1 ⊆ posi(A1) and A2 ⊆ B2 ⊆ posi(A2). This tells us that any
v1 ∈ B1 can be written as v1 = ∑u1∈A1 αv1,u1u1 with αu1,• > 0, and similarly, any v2 ∈ B2
can be written as v2 = ∑u2∈A2 βv2,u2u2 with βv2,• > 0.
Choose, for all u ∈ A1 and v ∈ A2, (λu,v ,µu,v)> 0, then we must show that
A := {λu,vu+ µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2} ∈ Rp(K),
or in other words that there is some B ∈ K such that A ⊆ B ⊆ posi(A). We will show that
there is some B ∈ Posi{B1,B2} that does the job, or in other words that there are suitable
choices of (κv1,v2 ,ρv1,v2)> 0 for all v1 ∈ B1 and v2 ∈ B2 such that
A ⊆ {κv1,v2v1+ρv1,v2v2 : v1 ∈ B1,v2 ∈ B2} ⊆ posi(A). (20)
For a start, if we let κu1,u2 := λu1,u2 and ρu1,u2 := µu1,u2 for all u1 ∈ A1 and all u2 ∈ A2, then
we are already guaranteed that the first inequality in (20) holds. It now remains to choose
the remaining (κv1,v2 ,ρv1,v2)> 0 in such a way that the second inequality in (20) will also
hold, meaning that κv1,v2v1+ρv1,v2v2 ∈ posi(A).
We consider three mutually exclusive possibilities, for any fixed remaining v1 and v2.
The first possibility is that v1 = u1 ∈ A1 and v2 ∈ B2 \A2. If there is some u2 ∈ A2 such
that µu1,u2 = 0 and therefore λu1,u2 > 0, then we choose κu1,v2 := λu1,u2 and ρu1,v2 := 0, and
then indeed
κu1,v2u1+ρu1,v2v2 = λu1,u2u1 = λu1,u2u1+ µu1,u2u2 ∈ A ⊆ posi(A).
If, on the other hand, µu1,u2 > 0 for all u2 ∈ A2, then we choose ρu1,v2 := 1 and
κu1,v2 := ∑
u2∈A2
λu1,u2
µu1,u2
βv2,u2 ,
and then indeed
κu1,v2u1+ρu1,v2v2 = ∑
u2∈A2
λu1,u2
µu1,u2
βv2,u2u1+ ∑
u2∈A2
βv2,u2u2
= ∑
u2∈A2
βv2,u2
µu1,u2
(λu1,u2u1+ µu1,u2u2) ∈ posi(A).
The second possibility is that v1 ∈ B1 \A1 and v2 = u2 ∈ A2, and this is treated in a
similar way as the first.
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And the third and last possibility is that v1 ∈ B1 \A2 and v2 ∈ B2 \A2. We now partition
both A1 and A2 in three disjoint pieces. For A1 we let A11 := {u1 ∈ A1 : αv1,u1 = 0}, A
2
1 :=
{u1 ∈A1\A
1
1 : (∀u2 ∈A2)µu1,u2 > 0} and A
3
1 := {u1 ∈A1\A
1
1 : (∃u2 ∈A2)µu1,u2 = 0}. Sim-
ilarly, for A2 we let A12 := {u2 ∈A2 : βv2,u2 = 0}, A
2
2 := {u2 ∈A2\A
1
2 : (∀u1 ∈A1)λu1,u2 > 0}
and A32 := {u2 ∈ A2 \A
1
2 : (∃u1 ∈ A1)λu1,u2 = 0}.
If A21 = /0 then it cannot be that also A
3
1 = /0, because αv1,u1 > 0 for at least one u1 ∈ A1.
So for each u1 ∈ A31 6= /0, we choose some u2,u1 ∈ A2 such that µu1,u2,u1 = 0 and therefore
λu1,u2,u1
> 0 [which is always possible, by the definition of A31], and we let κv1,v2 := 1 and
ρv1,v2 := 0. Then indeed
κv1,v2v1+ρv1,v2v2 = ∑
u1∈A
3
1
αv1,u1u1 = ∑
u1∈A
3
1
αv1,u1
λu1,u2,u1
(
λu1,u2,u1u1+ µu1,u2,u1u2
)
∈ posi(A).
A completely symmetrical argument can be made when A22 = /0, so we may now assume
without loss of generality that both A21 6= /0 and A
2
2 6= /0. Then, as before, for any u1 ∈ A
3
1
we choose some u2,u1 ∈ A2 such that µu1,u2,u1 = 0 and therefore λu1,u2,u1 > 0 [possible by
the definition of A31], and for any u2 ∈ A
3
2, we choose some u1,u2 ∈ A1 such that λu1,u2 ,u2 = 0
and therefore µu1,u2 ,u2 > 0 [possible by the definition of A
3
2]. We also let
w1 := ∑
u1∈A
2
1
αv1,u1u1 and w
′
1 := ∑
u1∈A
3
1
αv1,u1u1, so v1 = w1+w
′
1,
and
w2 := ∑
u2∈A
2
2
βv2,u2u2 and w
′
2 := ∑
u2∈A
3
2
βv2,u2u2, so v2 = w2+w
′
2.
Then we already know that, by a similar argument as before:
w′1 = ∑
u1∈A
3
1
αv1,u1
λu1,u2,u1
(
λu1,u2,u1
u1+ µu1,u2,u1u2,u1
)
∈ posi(A) (21)
and
w′2 = ∑
u2∈A
3
2
βv2,u2
µu1,u2 ,u2
(λu1,u2 ,u2u1,u2 + µu1,u2 ,u2u2) ∈ posi(A). (22)
Next, recall that λu1,u2 > 0 and µu1,u2 > 0 for any u1 ∈ A1 and u2 ∈ A2. We then infer from
λu1,u2u1+ µu1,u2u2 ∈ A for all u1 ∈ A
2
1 and u2 ∈ A
2
2 that
φv2,u1u1+w2 ∈ posi(A), with φv2,u1 := ∑
u2∈A
2
2
βv2,u2
λu1,u2
µu1,u2
> 0,
and therefore also
w1+ψv1,v1w2 ∈ posi(A), with ψv1,v2 := ∑
u1∈A
2
1
αv1,u1
φv2,u1
> 0. (23)
Now let κv1,v2 := 1 and ρv1,v2 := ψv1,v2 , then we infer from (21)–(23) that, indeed,
κv1,v2v1+ρv1,v2v2 = v1+ψv1,v2v2 = w1+w
′
1+ψv1,v2(w2+w
′
2)
= w1+ψv1,v2w2+w
′
1+ψv1,v2w
′
2 ∈ posi(A).
To prove that, finally, Rp(K) satisfies K4, consider any A1 ∈ Rp(K) and any A2 ∈ Q
such that A1 ⊆ A2. This implies on the one hand that posi(A1)⊆ posi(A2), and on the other
hand that there is some B1 ∈K such that A1⊆B1⊆ posi(A1), and therefore also posi(A1) =
posi(B1). But then posi(A2∪B1) = posi(A2∪posi(B1)) = posi(A2) and thereforeA2⊆A2∪
B1 ⊆ posi(A2). Since, moreover, B1 ∈K and B1 ⊆ A2∪B1, K4 guarantees that A2∪B1 ∈ K,
and therefore indeed A2 ∈ Rp(K). 
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Proposition 49. Any non-binary mixing set of desirable option sets K is strictly dominated
by some other mixing set of desirable option sets.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary mixing non-binary set of desirable option sets K. Since K is
non-binary and coherent, Lemma 40 guarantees the existence of a coherent set of desirable
option sets K∗ such that K ⊂ K∗. Let K∗∗ := Rp(K∗). Since K∗ is coherent, we know from
Proposition 48 that K∗∗ is mixing. Since Rp does not remove option sets, we also know
that K∗ ⊆ K∗∗. Since K ⊂ K∗, this implies that K is strictly dominated by the mixing set of
desirable option sets K∗∗. 
Lemma 50. For any non-empty chain K in KM, its union Ko :=
⋃
K is a mixing set of
desirable option sets.
Proof. Since KM ⊆ K, it follows from Lemma 41 that Ko is coherent. To prove that it
is also mixing, we consider any A,B ∈ Q such that B ∈ Ko and A ⊆ B ⊆ posi(A). Since
B ∈ Ko, there is some K′ ∈ K such that B ∈ K′, and since K′ is mixing, this implies that
A ∈ K′ ⊆ Ko. 
Lemma 51. For any mixing set of desirable option sets K ∈ KM and any set of desirable
option sets K∗ ∈K such that K∩K∗ = /0, the partially ordered set
↑KM := {K
′ ∈KM : K ⊆ K
′ and K′∩K∗ = /0}
has a maximal element.
Proof. We will use Zorn’s Lemma to establish the existence of a maximal element. So
consider any non-empty chain K in ↑KM, then we must prove that K has an upper bound
in ↑KM. Since Ko :=
⋃
K is clearly an upper bound, we are done if we can prove that
Ko ∈ ↑KM.
That Ko∩K∗ = /0 follows from the fact that K′∩K∗ = /0 for every K′ ∈K ⊆ ↑KM. That
Ko is mixing follows from Lemma 50. 
Proposition 52. Every mixing set of desirable option sets K ∈ KM is dominated by some
binary mixing set of desirable option sets.
Proof. Lemma 51 for K∗ = /0 guarantees that the partially ordered set {K′ ∈KM : K⊆ K′}
has a maximal element. Let Kˆ be any such maximal element. Assume ex absurdo that Kˆ is
non-binary. It then follows from Proposition 49 that Kˆ is strictly dominated by some other
mixing set of desirable option sets, meaning that there is some K∗ ∈KM such that Kˆ⊂ K∗.
Then clearly also K∗ ∈ {K′ ∈ K : K ⊆ K′}, which contradicts the maximal character of Kˆ.
Hence, it must be that Kˆ is indeed binary. 
Theorem 53 (Representation for mixing choice functions). Any mixing set of desirable
option sets K ∈ KM is dominated by some binary mixing set of desirable option sets:
DM(K) := {D ∈DM : K ⊆ KD} 6= /0. Moreover, K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ DM(K)}.
Proof of Theorem 53. Let Ko ∈ KM be any mixing set of desirable option sets. We prove
that DM(Ko) := {D ∈DM : Ko ⊆ KD} 6= /0 and that Ko =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ DM(Ko)}.
For the first statement, recall from Proposition 52 that Ko is dominated by some binary
mixing coherent set of desirable option sets Kˆ. Since Kˆ is binary, Proposition 6 implies
that Kˆ= KD , with D = DKˆ . Furthermore, because Kˆ is mixing, Proposition 18 implies that
DKˆ is mixing too, whence DKˆ ∈ DM. Since Ko ⊆ Kˆ = KDKˆ , we find that DKˆ ∈ DM(Ko) :=
{D ∈ DM : Ko ⊆ KD} 6= /0.
For the second statement, it is obvious that Ko ⊆
⋂
{KD : D ∈ DM(Ko)}, so we concen-
trate on the converse inclusion. Assume ex absurdo that Ko ⊂
⋂
{KD : D ∈ DM(Ko)}, so
there is some option set Bo ∈Q such that Bo /∈ Ko and Bo ∈ KD for all D ∈DM(Ko). Then
Bo\V0 /∈Ko [use the coherence ofKo and K4] and Bo\V0 ∈KD for allD ∈DM(Ko) [use
the coherence of KD—which follows from Proposition 32 and the coherence of D—and
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Proposition 36], so we may assume without loss of generality that Bo has no non-positive
options: Bo ∩V0 = /0. Moreover, if Bo contains some option w that is a positive linear
combination of other elements of Bo, then still Bo \ {w} /∈ Ko [use the coherence of Ko
and K4] and Bo \ {w} ∈ KD for all D ∈ DM(Ko) [use the coherence of KD and KM], so
we may assume without loss of generality that Bo has no elements that are positive linear
combinations of some of its other elements.
Consider the partially ordered set ↑Ko := {K ∈ KM : Ko ⊆ K and Bo /∈ K}, which is
non-empty because it contains Ko. Due to to Lemma 51 [applied for K = Ko and K∗ =
{Bo}], it has a maximal element. If we can prove that any such maximal element is binary,
then it will follow from Propositions 6 and 18 that there is some mixing set of desirable
options Do ∈ DM such that Ko ⊆ KDo—and therefore Do ∈ DM(Ko)—and Bo /∈ KDo , a
contradiction. To prove that all maximal elements of ↑Ko are binary, it suffices to prove
that any non-binary element of ↑Ko is strictly dominated in that set, which is what we now
set out to do.
So consider any non-binary mixing coherent element K of ↑Ko, so Ko ⊆ K and Bo /∈ K.
It follows from Lemma 33 that there is some Ao ∈ K such that |Ao| ≥ 2 and Ao \ {u} /∈ K
for all u ∈ Ao. The partially ordered set {A ∈ K : Bo ⊆ A} contains Ao∪Bo and therefore
has some minimal (undominating) element B∗ below it, so B∗ ∈ K and Bo ⊆ B∗ ⊆ Ao∪Bo.
Let us first summarise what we know about this minimal element B∗. It is impossible
that B∗⊆ Bo because otherwise Bo = B∗ ∈K, a contradiction. Hence B∗\Bo 6= /0, so we can
fix any element uo in B∗ \Bo ⊆ Ao. Then we know that {uo} /∈ K, because otherwise, since
Ao has at least one other element v [because |Ao| ≥ 2], we would have that {uo} ⊆ A \{v}
and therefore A \ {v} ∈ K by the coherence of K, a contradiction. And since also Bo ⊆
B∗ \ {uo} but B∗ \ {uo} ⊂ B∗, we can conclude that B∗ \ {uo} /∈ K, by the definition of a
minimal element. We also know that B∗, and therefore also Bo, cannot contain any positive
multiple µuo of uo with µ > 0 and µ 6= 1, because otherwise we could use Lemma 47
to remove uo from B∗ ∈ K and still be guaranteed that B∗ \ {uo} ∈ K. Since we know
that uo /∈ Bo, we would then still have that Bo ⊆ B∗ \ {uo}, which would contradict the
minimality of B∗ in the partially ordered set {A ∈ K : Bo ⊆ A}. And, finally, we know
that uo /∈ posi(Bo), because otherwise uo ∈ B∗ would be a positive linear combination of
elements of Bo ⊆ B∗ different from uo [because uo /∈ Bo], so we could use Proposition 48
and KM to make sure that still B∗ \ {uo} ∈ K, again contradicting the minimality of B∗ in
the partially ordered set {A ∈ K : Bo ⊆ A}.
Consider now the set of desirable option sets K∗ := Rp(K∗∗), with K∗∗ := Rn(K∗∗∗),
where
K∗∗∗ :=
{{
λvv+ µvuo : v ∈ B
}
: B ∈ K,(∀v ∈ B)(λv ,µv)> 0
}
.
We know from Lemma 39 [withK∗∗∗ in this proof taking on the role ofK∗∗ in the statement
of Lemma 39, and with K∗∗ in this proof taking on the role of K∗ in the statement of
Lemma 39] that K∗∗ is a coherent set of desirable option sets that is a superset of K and
contains {uo}. Proposition 48 now guarantees that K∗ =Rp(K∗∗) satisfies K0–K4 and KM,
and is therefore mixing. Furthermore, since Rp never removes option sets, K∗ is a superset
of K that contains {uo}. Since we know that {uo} /∈ K, this shows that K ⊂ K∗. If we can
now prove that Bo /∈ K∗ and therefore K∗ ∈ ↑Ko, we are done, because then K is strictly
dominated by K∗ in ↑Ko.
Assume therefore ex absurdo that Bo ∈ K∗ = Rp(Rn(K∗∗∗)), meaning that there are
C ∈ K, (λv ,µv)> 0 for all v ∈C and B ∈Q such that
{λvv+ µvuo : v ∈C}\V0 ⊆ B ⊆ {λvv+ µvuo : v ∈C} and Bo ⊆ B ⊆ posi(Bo). (24)
We let C2 := {v ∈C : λvv+ µvuo  0}, and consider any v ∈C2, so λvv+ µvuo  0. But
then we must have that λv > 0, because otherwise µvuo  0, with µv > 0, and therefore
also uo  0. But then Lemma 35 and Axiom K0 would imply that we can remove the
non-positive uo from Ao ∈ K and guarantee that still Ao \ {uo} ∈ K, which contradicts our
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assumptions about Ao. So we find that
v  −
µv
λv
uo for all v ∈C2.
If we also callC1 := {v ∈C : λvv+µvuo ∈ Bo}, then we infer from (24) thatC1 6= /0. Also,
C1∩C2 = /0, because we know that Bo∩V0 = /0. We complete the partition ofC by letting
C3 :=C \ (C1∪C2). We know that
for each b ∈ B there are vb ∈C such that b= λvbvb+ µvbuo.
This means that for any v ∈ C1 ∪C3 there is by construction a necessarily unique b ∈ B
such that v = vb, which we will denote by bv , so bv = λvv + µvuo. But then λv > 0,
because otherwise we would have that µvuo = bv ∈ B, with µv > 0, so (24) would imply
that uo ∈ posi(Bo), and we have argued above that this is impossible. So we find that
v =
1
λv
bv−
µv
λv
uo for all v ∈C1∪C3.
Let B3 := {bv : v ∈C3}, then it follows from our construction that B3 ⊆ posi(Bo)\Bo.
Since (C1∪C3)∪C2 =C ∈ K, we infer from Lemma 34 that if we construct the option
set C′ as follows
C′ :=
{
1
λv
bv−
µv
λv
uo : v ∈C1∪C3
}
∪
{
−
µv
λv
uo : v ∈C2
}
,
then stillC′ ∈K. If we recall that also B∗ ∈ K, we can invoke K3 to find that Posi{B∗,C′}⊆
K. In other words, we find that
{αu,vu+βu,vv : u ∈ B
∗,v ∈C′} ∈ K for all choices of (αu,v ,βu,v)> 0.
If we now choose (αuo,v ,βuo,v) := (µv ,λv) and (αu,v ,βu,v) := (1,0) for all u ∈ B
∗ \ {uo},
for all v ∈C′, then we find in particular that
{bv : v ∈C1∪C3}∪{0: v ∈C2}∪{u : u ∈ B
∗ \ {uo}}
= Bo∪B3∪{0: v ∈C2}∪B
∗ \ {uo}= B3∪B
∗ \ {uo}∪{0: v ∈C2}
belongs to K. If C2 = /0, we find that B3 ∪B∗ \ {uo} ∈ K. If C2 6= /0, we find that {0}∪
B3 ∪B
∗ \ {uo} ∈ K, and then we can still derive from K0 that B3 ∪B∗ \ {uo} ∈ K. Any
b ∈ B3 that does not belong to B∗ \ {uo} is a positive linear combination of elements of
Bo, and therefore of B∗ \ {uo}. Proposition 48 and KM then tell us that we can remove
such b and still be guaranteed that the result belongs to K. This tells us that B∗ \{uo} ∈ K,
a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 19. First assume that K is mixing. It then follows from Theorem 53 that
DM(K) := {D ∈ DM : K ⊆ KD} 6= /0 and K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ DM(K)}. This clearly implies
that there is at least one non-empty set D ⊆ DM of mixing sets of desirable options such
that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}: the set DM(K). Furthermore, for any non-empty set D ⊆DM of
mixing coherent sets of desirable options such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D}, we clearly have
that K ⊆ KD for all D ∈ D . Since D ⊆ DM, this implies that D ⊆ DM(K). So DM(K) is
indeed the largest such set.
It remains to prove the ‘if’ part. So consider any non-empty set D ⊆DM of mixing sets
of desirable options such that K=
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}. For everyD ∈D ⊆DM, it then follows
from Proposition 18 that KD is mixing. Because Axioms K0-K4 and KM are trivially
preserved under taking arbitrary (non-empty) intersections, this implies that K is, indeed,
also mixing. 
Proof of Proposition 20. First assume that D is mixing. Since Dc is trivially a subset of
posi(Dc), we only need to prove that posi(Dc) ⊆ Dc. So consider any u ∈ posi(Dc) and
assume ex absurdo that u /∈ Dc, so u ∈ D. Since u ∈ posi(Dc), we know that u is positive
linear combination of a finite number of elements of Dc. Hence, there is some (finite)
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option set A ∈Q such that A ⊆ Dc and u ∈ posi(A). Since we have assumed that u ∈ D,
this implies that posi(A)∩D 6= /0, so A ∩D 6= /0 because D satisfies DM by assumption.
Since A ⊆ Dc, we find that Dc ∩D 6= /0, a contradiction. So it must be that u ∈ Dc, and
therefore, indeed, posi(Dc)⊆Dc.
Conversely, assume that posi(Dc) = Dc, then we need to prove that D satisfies DM. So
consider any A ∈Q such that posi(A)∩D 6= /0 and assume ex absurdo that A∩D= /0. Then
A ⊆ Dc and therefore also posi(A) ⊆ posi(Dc) = Dc. So we find that posi(A)∩D = /0, a
contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 21. Consider any total set of desirable options D, and any A ∈ Q
such that A∩D = /0. If we can show that then also posi(A)∩D = /0, if will clearly follow
from Definition 17 that D is indeed mixing.
So consider any u ∈ posi(A), then we need to prove that u /∈ D. Since u ∈ posi(A), u
is a finite positive linear combination of elements of A, meaning that u = ∑ni=1 λiui, with
n ∈ N and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, λi > 0 and ui ∈ A. Let I := {i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} : ui 6= 0}. Then
for all i ∈ I, since ui ∈ A, A ∩D = /0 and ui 6= 0, it follows from the totality of D that
−ui ∈ D. We now consider two cases: I = /0 and I 6= /0. If I = /0 then u = 0, which, since
D is in particular also coherent [use Axiom D1], implies that, indeed, u /∈ D. If I 6= /0 then
−u = ∑ni=1λi(−ui) = ∑i∈I λi(−ui) is a finite positive linear combination of elements of D,
and it therefore follows from the coherence of D [Axiom D3] that −u ∈ D. This implies
that, indeed, u /∈D, because otherwise, it would follow from AxiomD3 that 0= u−u ∈D,
contradicting Axiom D1. 
A.7. Proofs and intermediate results for Section 9. Various proofs in this section make
use of the arch(·) operator, defined for any set of desirable options D ∈D by
arch(D) := {u ∈ D : (∃ε ∈ R>0)u− ε ∈ D},
where the identification of ε ∈ R>0 with an option in V is justified by the additional as-
sumptions on V that we impose in Section 9.
Proof of Proposition 24. First consider any Archimedean—and hence also coherent—set
of desirable options D. We will prove that PD is a coherent lower prevision on L (X ),
that DPD = D, and that if D is moreover mixing, then PD is a linear prevision.
We begin by showing that PD is a coherent lower prevision on L (X ). Consider any
u ∈L (X ) and any µ ∈ R such that µ < infu. Since D is coherent [use D2] and V≻0 =
Lsp(X ) := {u ∈L (X ) : infu > 0}, we find that u−µ ∈D, because inf(u−µ) = infu−
µ > 0. Since this is true for any µ ∈R such that µ < infu, we infer from Equation (12) that
PD(u) ≥ infu. So PD satisfies LP1. Next, we prove that PD is a real-valued map. To this
end, consider again any u ∈L (X ). Since u is bounded, infu and supu are real. Consider
any µ ∈ R such that µ > supu. Then inf(µ − u) = µ − supu > 0, so D2 implies that
µ − u ∈ D. Hence, u− µ /∈ D, because otherwise it would follow from D3 that 0 = (u−
µ)+ (µ − u) ∈ D, contradicting D1. Since this is true for any µ ∈ R such that µ > supu,
Equation (12) implies that PD(u) ≤ supu. On the other hand, we know from LP1 that
PD(u) ≥ infu. Since infu and supu are real, we find that PD(u) is real, so PD is indeed
a real-valued map. It remains to show that PD satisfies LP2 and LP3. We start with LP2.
Consider any u ∈L (X ) and λ ∈ R>0. For all µ ∈ R, it then follows from the coherence
of D [use D3] that u−µ ∈ D if and only if λu−λ µ ∈ D. Equation (12) therefore implies
that PD(λu) = λPD(u). So PD satisfies LP2. Next, for LP3, consider any u,v ∈L (X ).
Fix any ε ∈ R>0. It then follows from Equation (12) that there is some µu ∈ R such
that µu > PD(u)− ε and u− µu ∈ D, and similarly, that there is some µv ∈ R such that
µv > PD(v)− ε and u− µv ∈ D. The coherence of D [use D3] now implies that u+ v−
µu − µv ∈ D, so Equation (12) implies that PD(u+ v) ≥ µu + µv > PD(u)+PD(v)− 2ε .
Since this inequality holds for every ε ∈ R>0, we infer that PD(u+ v) ≥ PD(u)+PD(v).
Hence, PD satisfies LP3.
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Next, we prove that DPD = D. First consider any u ∈ D. Since D is Archimedean, we
know that there is some ε ∈ R>0 such that u− ε ∈ D. Combined with Equation (12), this
implies that PD(u) ≥ ε > 0. So we infer from Equation (13) that u ∈ DPD . Conversely,
consider any u ∈ DPD . Equation (13) then implies that PD(u) > 0, so we know from
Equation (12) that there is some µ ∈ R>0 such that u− µ ∈ D. Therefore, and because
µ ∈Lsp(X ), it follows from the coherence ofD [use D2 and D3] that u=(u−µ)+µ ∈D.
We conclude that, indeed, DPD = D.
Suppose now that D is also mixing. We prove that PD is a linear prevision. Since we
already know that PD is a coherent lower prevision, it suffices to prove that PD satisfies P3.
So consider any u,v ∈ L (X ). We only need to prove that PD(u+ v) ≤ PD(u)+PD(v)
because the converse inequality follows from LP3. Fix any µ ∈ R such that µ > PD(u)+
PD(v) and let ε := 1/2
(
µ −PD(u)−PD(v)
)
> 0. It then follows from Equation (12) that
uε := u− (PD(u)+ ε) /∈D and vε := v− (PD(v)+ ε) /∈D. So if we let A := {uε ,vε}, then
A ∩D = /0. Therefore, and since A ∈ Q and {uε ,vε ,uε + vε} ⊆ posi(A), it follows from
the mixingness of D that {uε ,vε ,uε + vε}∩D = /0. Hence, we find that
u+ v− µ = u+ v−PD(u)−PD(v)− 2ε = uε + vε /∈ D.
Since this holds for all µ ∈R such that µ > PD(u)+PD(v), it follows from Equation (12)
that PD(u+ v)≤ PD(u)+PD(v), as desired.
For the second part of this proposition, we consider any coherent lower prevision P on
L (X ). We will prove that DP is an Archimedean set of desirable options, that PDP = P,
and that if P furthermore is a linear prevision, then DP is mixing.
We start by proving that DP is Archimedean, meaning that it satisfies D1–D3 and DA.
Since LP3 implies that P(0) + P(0) ≤ P(0), and since P is real-valued, we know that
P(0)≤ 0, so Equation (13) implies that 0 /∈DP . Hence, DP satisfies D1. For D2, it suffices
to observe that for any u ∈ V≻0 = Lsp(X ), P(u) ≥ infu > 0 because of LP1, so u ∈ DP
because of Equation (13). Let us now proveD3. Consider any u,v ∈DP and any (λ ,µ)> 0.
It then follows from Equation (13) that P(u)> 0 and P(v)> 0, and from LP2 and LP3 that
P(λu+µv)≥ λP(u)+µP(v). Since (λ ,µ)> 0, this implies that P(λu+µv)> 0, which
in turn implies that λu + µv ∈ DP because of Equation (13). So DP satisfies D3. Let
us now prove DA. Consider any u ∈ DP , so P(u) > 0 because of Equation (13). Let
ε := 12P(u)> 0. Then since P is a coherent lower prevision,
P(u− ε)≥ P(u)+P(−ε)≥ P(u)+ inf(−ε) = P(u)− ε = 2ε− ε = ε > 0,
so u− ε ∈ DP because of Equation (13). Hence indeed, DP also satisfies DA.
Next, we prove that PDP = P. Consider any u ∈ L (X ) and any µ ∈ R. Then on the
one hand, if µ < P(u), it follows from LP3 and LP1 that
P(u− µ)≥ P(u)+P(−µ)≥ P(u)+ inf(−µ) = P(u)− µ > 0,
so Equation (13) implies that u− µ ∈ DP . On the other hand, if µ > P(u), it follows
from LP1 and LP3 that
P(u− µ) = P(u− µ)+ µ− µ ≤ P(u− µ)+P(µ)− µ ≤ P(u)− µ < 0
so Equation (13) implies that u−µ /∈ DP . We conclude from Equation (12) that PDP = P.
Finally, suppose that P is furthermore a linear prevision. We prove that DP is mixing.
Since we already know that DP is coherent, it suffices to prove that DP satisfies DM. So
consider any A ∈Q such that posi(A)∩DP 6= /0, so there is some u ∈ posi(A) such that also
u ∈ DP . Since u ∈ posi(A), it follows from Equation (11) that u = ∑nk=1 λkuk, with n ∈ N
and, for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, λk ∈ R>0 and uk ∈ A. It therefore follows from LP3 and LP2
that
P(u) = P
(
n
∑
k=1
λkuk
)
≥
n
∑
k=1
λkP(uk).
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Furthermore, since u ∈ DP , we know from Equation (13) that P(u) > 0. Hence, since
λk > 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, there must be some k∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that P(uk∗) > 0.
Equation (13) then implies that uk∗ ∈ DP . Since we also know that uk∗ ∈ A, this in turn
implies that A∩DP 6= /0. We conclude that DP satisfies DM, as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 27. We know from Proposition 8 that D is coherent if and only if KD
is, and from Proposition 18 tells us that D is mixing if and only if KD is. So the only thing
left to prove is that D satisfies DA if and only if KD satisfies KA.
First assume that D satisfies DA. Consider any A ∈ KD , meaning that A∩D 6= /0. Con-
sider any u ∈ A ∩D. Since u ∈ D and D is Archimedean, we know that there is some
ε ∈ R>0 such that u− ε ∈D. Since u ∈ A, we also know that u− ε ∈ A− ε . We therefore
find that u ∈ (A− ε)∩D, which implies that (A− ε)∩D 6= /0, or equivalently, that, indeed
A− ε ∈ KD .
Conversely, assume that KD satisfies KA. Consider any u ∈ D. Then {u} ∈ KD and
therefore, since KD is Archimedean, there is some ε ∈R>0 such that {u}− ε ∈ KD . Since
{u}− ε = {u− ε}, this implies that, indeed, u− ε ∈ D. 
Lemma 54. For any coherent set of desirable options D ∈ D, arch(D) is coherent.
Proof. Consider any coherent set of desirable options D ∈ D, arch(D), then we have to
prove that arch(D) satisfies Axioms D1–D3.
That arch(D) satisfies D1 follows directly from the fact thatD does, because arch(D)⊆
D. To prove that arch(D) satisfies D2, we consider any u ∈ V≻0. Then infu > 0, so there
is some ε ∈ R>0 such that inf(u− ε) > 0. Since D is coherent, this implies that u− ε ∈
V≻0 ⊆ D, and therefore that u ∈ arch(D). To prove that arch(D) satisfies D3, we consider
any u,v ∈ arch(D) and λ ,µ ≥ 0 such that λ + µ > 0, and prove that λu+ µv ∈ arch(D).
Since u,v ∈ arch(D), there are εu ,εv ∈ R>0 such that u− εu ∈ D and v− εv ∈ D, which,
since D satisfies D3, implies that λu+ µv− (λ εu + µεv) = λ (u− εu)+ µ(v− εv) ∈ D.
Since λ εu + µεv ∈ R>0, this implies that λu+ µv ∈ arch(D). 
Lemma 55. For any coherent set of desirable options D ∈ D, arch(D) is Archimedean.
Proof. Due to Lemma 54, we already know that arch(D) is coherent, so it only remains
to prove that arch(D) satisfies DA. Consider any u ∈ arch(D). This implies that u ∈ D
and that there is some ε ∈ R>0 such that u− ε ∈ D. Since
1
2ε ∈ V≻0 and u− ε ∈ D, the
coherence of D implies that u− 12ε = (u− ε)+
1
2ε ∈D. Since (u−
1
2ε)−
1
2ε = u− ε ∈D
and 12ε ∈R>0, this implies that u−
1
2ε ∈ arch(D). Since this is true for every u ∈ arch(D),
we conclude that arch(D) is indeed Archimedean. 
Lemma 56. For any mixing set of desirable options D ∈DM, arch(D) is mixing.
Proof. Consider any mixing set of desirable options D ∈ DM. Since D is in particular
coherent, we infer from Lemma 54 that arch(D) is coherent too, so we only need to prove
that arch(D) satisfies DM.
So consider any A ∈Q such that posi(A)∩ arch(D) 6= /0. Then there is at least one u ∈
posi(A) such that u ∈ arch(D). Fix any such u. Since u ∈ arch(D), there is some ε ∈ R>0
such that u− ε ∈ D. Fix any such ε . Since u ∈ posi(A), we know that u = ∑ni=1 λiui, with
n ∈N and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, λi > 0 and ui ∈ A. Let λ := ∑
n
i=1 λi > 0 and α := 1/λ > 0.
Then
u− ε =
n
∑
i=1
λiui−α
(
n
∑
i=1
λi
)
ε =
n
∑
i=1
λi(ui−αε),
so u − ε ∈ posi(A−αε). Since also u − ε ∈ D, it follows that posi(A−αε)∩D 6= /0.
Because D is by assumption mixing, we find that (A−αε)∩D 6= /0, meaning that there
is some u˜ ∈ A such that u˜−αε ∈ D. Since αε ∈ R>0, we conclude that u˜ ∈ arch(D), so,
indeed, A∩ arch(D) 6= /0. 
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Lemma 57. For any Archimedean set of desirable options D ∈ DA, arch(D) =D.
Proof. Since arch(D) is trivially a subset of D, we only need to prove that D ⊆ arch(D).
So consider any u ∈ D. Then since D is Archimedean, there is some ε ∈ R>0 such that
u−ε ∈D, which implies that u ∈ arch(D). Since this is true for every u ∈D, we conclude
that indeed, D ⊆ arch(D). 
Lemma 58. Consider any non-empty set D ⊆D of coherent sets of desirable options such
that K :=
⋂
{KD : D ∈D} is Archimedean. Then also K =
⋂
{Karch(D) : D ∈D}.
Proof. For any D ∈D , since arch(D)⊆D, it follows that Karch(D) ⊆ KD . Hence,⋂
{Karch(D) : D ∈D} ⊆
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}= K,
so it remains to prove the converse set inclusion. To this end, consider any D ∈ D and
any A ∈ K. Then since K is Archimedean, we know that there is some ε ∈ R>0 such that
A− ε ∈ K ⊆ KD . Fix any such ε . A− ε ∈ KD implies that there is some u ∈ A such
that u− ε ∈ D, by Equation (8). Since D is coherent [use Axiom D3] and also ε ∈ D
[use ε ∈ V≻0 and Axiom D2], this in turn implies that u ∈ D. Since also u− ε ∈ D, it
follows that u ∈ arch(D) and therefore, that A ∩ arch(D) 6= /0. Hence, A ∈ Karch(D), again
by Equation (8). Since this is true for everyD ∈D and any A ∈ K, we find that, as desired,
K ⊆
⋂
{Karch(D) : D ∈D}. 
Proof of Proposition 26. First assume that K is Archimedean. Then K is in particular co-
herent, and therefore so is R, by Proposition 4. It therefore remains to prove that R satis-
fies RA. Consider, to this end, any A ∈Q and u ∈V such that u ∈R(A∪{u}). Equation (5)
then tells us thatA−u ∈K. SinceK is Archimedean, this implies that there is some ε ∈R>0
such that A−u−ε ∈ K, so it follows from Equation (5) that, indeed, u ∈ R((A−ε)∪{u}).
Next, assume that R is coherent and satisfies RA. Then it already follows from Propos-
ition 4 that K is coherent, so we only need to prove that K satisfies KA. Consider, to this
end, any A ∈ K. Equation (5) then tells us that 0 ∈ R(A∪{0}). Since R satisfies RA, this
implies that there is some ε ∈ R>0 such that 0 ∈ R((A− ε)∪{0}). Hence, it follows from
Equation (5) that A− ε ∈ K, as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 28. First assume that K is Archimedean. It then follows from The-
orem 9 that D(K) := {D ∈ D : K ⊆ KD} 6= /0 and K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D(K)}. Let D
∗
A(K) :=
{arch(D) : D ∈ D(K)} 6= /0, then Lemma 58 already guarantees that K = ∩{KD : D ∈
D
∗
A(K)}.
We first prove that DA(K) = D
∗
A(K). To this end, first consider any D ∈ D
∗
A(K). Then
K ⊆ KD because K = ∩{KD : D ∈ D
∗
A(K)}. Furthermore, it follows from Lemmas 54
and 55 that D ∈ DA. Hence D ∈ DA(K), and therefore D
∗
A(K) ⊆ DA(K). Conversely,
consider any D ∈ DA(K). Since D is Archimedean, it follows from Lemma 57 that
arch(D) = D, and because also D ∈ DA(K) ⊆ D(K), we find that D = arch(D) ∈ D
∗
A(K).
So DA(K)⊆ D
∗
A(K), and therefore, indeed, DA(K) = D
∗
A(K).
Next, we prove that DA(K) is closed. So consider any convergent sequence {Dn}n∈N in
DA(K) and let D∞ be its limit. Then we need to prove thatD∞ ∈DA(K). Equation (14) and
Proposition 24 tell us that D∞ = DP , where P is the point-wise limit of the corresponding
convergent sequence of coherent lower previsions {PDn}n∈N. Indeed, since for any n ∈ N,
Dn is Archimedean, we know from Proposition 24 that PDn is a coherent lower prevision.
Therefore, and because P is closed and compact in the (weak*) topology induced by point-
wise convergence [10, 21], the limit P is a coherent lower prevision as well, so we infer
from Proposition 24 that D∞ = DP is Archimedean, so D∞ ∈ DA. It therefore remains to
prove that K ⊆ KD∞ . Consider, to this end, any A ∈ K. Since K is Archimedean, there is
some ε ∈ R>0 such that A− ε ∈ K. Fix any n ∈ N. Then since Dn ∈ DA(K), we have
that K ⊆ KDn . Therefore, and because A− ε ∈ K, we infer from Equation (8) that there is
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some un ∈ A such that un− ε ∈ Dn and therefore also PDn(un) ≥ ε . So for all n ∈ N, we
have some un ∈ A such that PDn(un) ≥ ε . Since A is finite, this implies that there is some
u∗ ∈ A and some subsequence {Dni}i∈N such that PDni (u
∗)≥ ε for all i ∈N. Since P is the
point-wise limit of {PDn}n∈N and therefore also the point-wise limit of the subsequence
{PDni
}i∈N, this implies that P(u
∗) ≥ ε > 0, so u∗ ∈ DP = D∞. Since u∗ ∈ A, this implies
that A ∈KD∞ , again by Equation (8). Since this is true for every A ∈K, we find that, indeed,
K ⊆ KD∞ , so D∞ ∈DA(K) and DA(K) is therefore indeed closed.
What we have found so far is that that there is a least one non-empty closed set D ⊆DA
such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}, because DA(K) =D
∗
A(K) 6= /0 satisfies all these properties.
Furthermore, for any other non-empty closed set D ⊆ DA such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈D},
we clearly have that K ⊆ KD for all D ∈D . Since D ⊆ DA, this implies that D ⊆ DA(K),
so DA(K) is indeed the largest such set.
On to the ‘if’ part. Consider any non-empty closed set D ⊆ DA of Archimedean sets
of desirable options such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D}. For every D ∈ D ⊆ DA, it then fol-
lows from Proposition 27 that KD is Archimedean. Because Axioms K0-K4 are trivially
preserved under taking arbitrary (non-empty) intersections, it already follows that K is co-
herent. It therefore only remains to prove that K is Archimedean as well, or in other words
that K satisfies KA.
To this end, consider any A ∈ K and assume ex absurdo that A− ε /∈ K for all ε ∈R>0.
Fix any n ∈ N and let εn := 1/n > 0, so by assumption A− εn /∈ K. Hence, since K =⋂
{KD : D ∈D}, there is some Dn ∈D such that A− εn /∈ KDn . This allows us to consider
the sequence {PDn}n∈N, which, because of Proposition 24, belongs to P. Since we already
know that P is compact under the (weak*) topology induced by point-wise convergence,
this sequence has some subsequence {PDni}i∈N that converges point-wise to a limit P ∈ P.
Since P ∈ P, we know from Proposition 24 that P = PD∞ , with D∞ :=DP an Archimedean
set of desirable options. Equation (14) tells us that also D∞ = limi→+∞Dni , and since D
was assumed to be closed, this implies that D∞ ∈D . Since A ∈ K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}, this
in turn implies that A ∈ KD∞ , so there is some u ∈ A such that u ∈ D∞, by Equation (8).
Since D∞ = DP , this implies that P(u) > 0. Fix any n ∈ N. Since by our construction
A−εn /∈KDn , we know that (A−εn)∩Dn = /0, and therefore, since u ∈ A, that u−εn /∈Dn,
again by Equation (8). Since we know from Proposition 24 that Dn = DPDn , this implies
that PDn(u− εn) ≤ 0. Because Proposition 24 also tells us that PDn is a coherent lower
prevision, this in turn implies that
0≥ PDn(u− εn)≥ PDn(u)+PDn(−εn)≥ PDn(u)− εn,
whence PDn(u)≤ εn = 1/n. Since this is true for every n ∈N, we find that
P(u) = lim
i→+∞
PDni
(u)≤ lim
i→+∞
1
i
= 0.
However, we had already found that P(u)> 0, a contradiction. Hence, there must be some
ε ∈ R>0 such that A− ε ∈ K. Since this is true for every A ∈ K, we find that K is indeed
Archimedean. 
Proof of Theorem 29. First assume that K is mixing and Archimedean. It then follows
from Theorem 53 that DM(K) := {D ∈ DM : K ⊆ KD} 6= /0 and K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ DM(K)}.
Let D
∗
M,A(K) := {arch(D) : D ∈ DM(K)} 6= /0, then Lemma 58 already guarantees that
K = ∩{KD : D ∈ D
∗
M,A(K)}.
We first prove that DM,A(K) = D
∗
M,A(K). To this end, first consider any D ∈ D
∗
M,A(K).
Then K ⊆ KD because K = ∩{KD : D ∈ D
∗
M,A(K)}. Furthermore, it follows from Lem-
mas 54–56 thatD ∈DM,A. HenceD ∈DM,A(K), and thereforeD
∗
M,A(K)⊆DM,A(K). Con-
versely, consider any D ∈ DM,A(K). Since D is Archimedean, it follows from Lemma 57
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that arch(D) = D, and because also D ∈ DM,A(K) ⊆ DM(K), we find that D = arch(D) ∈
D
∗
M,A(K). So DM,A(K)⊆ D
∗
M,A(K), and therefore, indeed, DM,A(K) = D
∗
M,A(K).
Next, we prove that DM,A(K) is closed. So consider any convergent sequence {Dn}n∈N
in DM,A(K) and let D∞ be its limit. Then we need to prove that D∞ ∈ DM,A(K). Equa-
tion (14) and Proposition 24 tell us that D∞ = DP , where P is the point-wise limit of the
corresponding convergent sequence of coherent lower previsions {PDn}n∈N. Since for any
n ∈ N, Dn is mixing and Archimedean, we know from Proposition 24 that PDn is a linear
prevision. Therefore, and because P is closed and compact in the (weak*) topology in-
duced by point-wise convergence [10, 21, 25], the limit P is a linear prevision as well, so
we infer from Proposition 24 that D∞ = DP is mixing and Archimedean, so D∞ ∈ DM,A.
It therefore remains to prove that K ⊆ KD∞ . Consider, to this end, any A ∈ K. Since K
is Archimedean, there is some ε ∈ R>0 such that A− ε ∈ K. Fix any n ∈ N. Then since
Dn ∈ DM,A(K), we have that K ⊆ KDn . Therefore, and because A− ε ∈ K, we infer from
Equation (8) that there is some un ∈ A such that un−ε ∈Dn and therefore also PDn(un)≥ ε .
So for all n∈N, we have some un ∈ A such that PDn(un)≥ ε . Since A is finite, this implies
that there is some u∗ ∈ A and some subsequence {Dni}i∈N such that PDni (u
∗) ≥ ε for all
i ∈ N. Since P is the point-wise limit of {PDn}n∈N and therefore also the point-wise limit
of the subsequence {PDni}i∈N, this implies that P(u
∗) ≥ ε > 0, so u∗ ∈ DP = D∞. Since
u∗ ∈ A, this implies that A ∈ KD∞ , again by Equation (8). Since this is true for every A ∈ K,
we find that, indeed, K ⊆ KD∞ , so D∞ ∈ DM,A(K) and DM,A(K) is therefore indeed closed.
What we have found so far is that that there is a least one non-empty closed set D ⊆
DM,A such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D}, because DM,A(K) = D
∗
M,A(K) 6= /0 satisfies all these
properties. Furthermore, for any other non-empty closed set D ⊆ DM,A such that K =⋂
{KD : D ∈D}, we clearly have that K⊆KD for all D ∈D . Since D ⊆DM,A, this implies
that D ⊆ DM,A(K), so DM,A(K) is indeed the largest such set.
We now turn to the ‘if’ part. So consider any non-empty closed set D ⊆ DM,A of
Archimedean and mixing sets of desirable options such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D}. For
every D ∈ D ⊆ DM,A, it then follows from Proposition 27 that KD is Archimedean and
mixing. Because Axioms K0-K4 and KM are trivially preserved under taking arbitrary
(non-empty) intersections, it already follows that K is mixing. It therefore only remains to
prove that K is Archimedean as well, or in other words—because we already know that K
is coherent because mixing—that K satisfies KA.
To this end, consider any A ∈ K and assume ex absurdo that A− ε /∈ K for all ε ∈
R>0. Fix any n ∈ N and let εn := 1/n > 0, so by assumption A− εn /∈ K. Hence, since
K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D}, there is some Dn ∈ D such that A− εn /∈ KDn . This allows us to
consider the sequence {PDn}n∈N, which, because of Proposition 24, belongs to P. Since
we already know that P is compact under the (weak*) topology induced by point-wise
convergence, this sequence has some subsequence {PDni}i∈N that converges point-wise to
a limit P∈ P. Since P∈ P, we know from Proposition 24 that P= PD∞ , with D∞ := DP
a mixing and Archimedean set of desirable options. Equation (14) tells us that also D∞ =
limi→+∞Dni , and since D was assumed to be closed, this implies that D∞ ∈ D . Since
A ∈ K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D}, this in turn implies that A ∈ KD∞ , so there is some u ∈ A such
that u ∈ D∞, by Equation (8). Since D∞ = DP, this implies that P(u)> 0. Fix any n ∈ N.
Since by our construction A− εn /∈ KDn , we know that (A− εn)∩Dn = /0, and therefore,
since u ∈ A, that u− εn /∈ Dn, again by Equation (8). Since we know from Proposition 24
thatDn =DPDn , this implies that PDn(u−εn)≤ 0. Because Proposition 24 also tells us that
PDn is a coherent lower prevision, this in turn implies that
0≥ PDn(u− εn)≥ PDn(u)+PDn(−εn)≥ PDn(u)− εn,
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whence PDn(u)≤ εn = 1/n. Since this is true for every n ∈N, we find that
P(u) = lim
i→+∞
PDni
(u)≤ lim
i→+∞
1
i
= 0.
However, we had already found that P(u)> 0, a contradiction. Hence, there must be some
ε ∈ R>0 such that A− ε ∈ K. Since this is true for every A ∈ K, we find that K is indeed
Archimedean. 
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